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Draft Recommendation
on Maastricht II: the WEU Assembly's proposals for
European cooperation on security and defence 
-
reply to the annual report ofthe Council
The Assemblr',
(t) Deeplv disappointed that it recently proved impossrble for thc European Union to rmplemcnt. m
the framervork of the CFSP, a comrnon pohcy m the context of the Albanian cnsis so as to grve WEU a
mandate m pursuance of Article I 4.2 of the Treaty on European Uruon for the purpose of finding ways
of bringing the cnsrs to an end;
Al Equally disappointed that rn the Albanian crlsls the WEU Councrl did not avarl rtself of the
crisis-management means at tts disposal by' virtue of the modrfied Brussels Treatl' and rts Petersberg
Declaration and merely responded belatedly and rnadequately to the Albanian request for assrstance.
(iii) Expressmg rts gratitude to and solidarrty rvrth Italy, France. Spain and Grccce as WEU mcm-
bers, Turkey as an assoclate member. Denmark as a member of NATO, Austrra as a WEU observcr
country, Romania as a WEU assocrate partner country and all thc other states lvhrch. under ltall"s lead-
ership, havc sent troops to Albania to supcrvlse the humanitanan rclief operatron. rvhrle at the samc timc
regrettmg that WEU member states did not particrpate in thrs operation rn grcatcr number;
(w) Takrng the vtcw nevertheless that far more strenuous cfforts are requrrcd rn order to rcstorc
order in Albanra, take possession of all rvcapons stolen from storage depots and prevent the unstable
sttuatron m the countn' from posing a threat to the entire neighbounng reglon.
(v) Strongly regretting that it has not received the nccessarl, informatron on the stage rcached m
negottations at the intergovernmental confcrence on the future relationship betrveen WEU and the Euro-
pean Union, whereas representatives of the European Parhament are regularh, mformed by the Presi-
dencl' of the European Unron and also receive rnformatron about WEU's actrvrtres from the WEU
Sccretariat-General.
(w) Noting that the intergovernmental conference is discussrng WEU's future role and that five
member statcs of the Union that are not members of WEU have full votmg rrghts at the confcrence,
(wt) Drsappointed that the draft Treaty revisron outhnes rssued to date do not realll' prol,ide any sat-
rsfactory response to the genuinely fundamental polrtical issues concerning Europc's future role on thc
rvorld stage for the purpose ofguaranteeing international peace and secuntl'. but are confined to purely
institutronal and procedural aspects;
(vrt) Convinced that no deciston can be taken on uhether the tasks inherent in a common European
defence can be progressrvelv transferred to the European Unron untrl.
(a) itbecomes clear that such a move rs compatiblc urth thc decrsions taken rn Berlin to dcvelop
the European securitl' and defencc rdcntrty within the Atlantrc Alhancc through the rntermedrary
of WEU,
(b) there ts a clear and coherent perceptlon of the purpose of transforming the European Unron to
mclude, inter aha, a real defence community urth all the consequcnces that cntarls for thc
transatlantic relationship, the admission of nerv mcmbers, the particrpatron of member states rvith
a neutral traditron, relatrons with Russia and the form of parliamentary control;
(c) fi has been fully established that the basis for conferring rcsponsrbility' upon the European
Union for all matters concerning external security 
- 
as provided for by the Maastricht Treatl' 
-
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must bc the mutual assrstance obligatron contarned rn Article V of the modified Brussels Treatl'.
u'hich must become an essenttal proviston of thc Treatv on European Uruon;
(O Taking the vrov that the plan submrtted b1, srx EU member statcs for the gradual integratron of
WEU rn the European Unron has the merit of referrrng to a possible ttmeframe and that even though rt
fixcs ambrguous objectn'cs, the proposal it contains for a uhtte paper outhnlng a common defence pol-
rcv concept ls one \\'a\'. among others. of drau,ing closer to the goal of a common European defence in
u'hrch all member states of the Union rvould take part.
(r) Convmced that untrl all the mcmber states of the Europcan Union havc subscnbed the modified
Brusscls Treatl'and untrl WEU assocrate membcrs have partrcipatory rights rn CFSP drscusslons. glv-
rng thc European Councrl competence to set gcncral guidelines for WEU or conferrtng upon the Councrl
of the European Unron. b1' vrrtue of Artrcle J 4 2 of the Treatl' on European Union. thc right to monitor
the actrvrtres of WEU rvrll not be conducrvc to the estabhshment of a genuine European colrlmon
defence .
(n) Strcssrng on the contran'that for as long as this situation persrsts, WEU must preserve its full
capabrlrtl to act and take decrsions m all the arcas of responsibrlrty confcrred upon rt by' the modified
Brussels Trcatr'. at the sams trme ensurrng that, ln senous situatrons. lt ls not beset by' tndecision, as
proved the casc in the Albanian crisis.
(nt) Desirous that the current proccdure xherebl'thc Union requests WEU on a case-b1'-case basis
to elaborate and rmplement decrsrons and actrons of the Uruon rn the field of defence be replaccd by a
gcneral provlslon rn the Treatl' to the cffect that the Unron entrusts WEU rvrth the task of takrng the
rclel'ant decrsrons on behalf of the European Uruon and rmplcmenting them,
(nn) Hoprng that a reference to Pctcrsberg tasks and possrbll'to armaments policy in the Treaty' on
European Unron urll not lead to an undesrrable fragmcntatton of areas of competcnce but rvrll serve to
confirm WEU's responsrbrlrtres rn thrs regard and urll encourage WEU observcr states to revtse thetr
pohcl'.
(nt) Convrnced that for as long as countries continue to take dectstons tn an tndtvtdual capacitt' on
the deplovmcnt of therr armcd forces, parhamentary morutortng of European secunty and defcnce
actrvrtrcs must remaln a matter for an assemblv composed of delegatrons of natronal parltaments,
(xv) Deplonng the fact that the WEU Councrl has not prepared a revised verslon of rts November
1995 contnbutron to the rntergovernmental confcrcnce and that by not convef ing thc second part of its
42nd annual report to the Assembll'on trme. it has yct again failed to fulfil its obligatrons under Artrcle
IX of the modrfied Brussels Treatl.
(wr) Eager to make a posltl\,e contnbution to the intcrgo'v'ernmental conference on the revision of the
Trcatv on Europcan Unton,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.INCIL
I Conver'. vra thc Presrdency of the European Unron, the follou'ing proposals to the particrpants in
the rntcrgovernmental conference :
(a) Article J 4 I of the Treatl'on European Union should read
"The corrunon forergn and securrty policy' shall includc all questions relatrng to the securitl' of the
Unron. includrng the progressrve framing of a common defence pohcl' rn the perspecttve of a
corrrmon defcncc."
and should be supplemented by'the follou'ing
"Full applicatron of the modified Brussels Treatv b1, 10 of the l5 European Union member states
that bclong to WEU shall constitute an important means to that end "
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(b) Subparagraph I of Artrcle J 4 2 should read
"The Western European Union together lrrth all its instrtutions is therefore an integral part of the
development of the European Unron and the Union shall accordingll' foster closer rnstrtutronal
and u'orking relations wrth it. Thc Member States of the EU and the WEU have madc rt therr arm
to enable all WEU assoclate mcmber, assocrate partner and observer countrres to partrcrpate pro-
gressivelv rn all aspects of a common European defence. Thev u'ill u'ork activcly rn thc European
Uruon and the WEU to achreve that aim u'hrch should make progressive mtegratron betueen the
WEU and the Unron possible. Thrs can be achieved in several phases rvhrch shall be defined rn
greater dctarl in a separate document. to be draftedlorntll'bl'the WEU and the European Union."
Subparagraph 2 of Articl e J .4 .2 should read:
'-Thc competent bodres of the WEU and the European Uruon shall begrn the relevant negotiations
to thrs end upon slgnature of the revrsed Treaty' on Europcan Unron Thel' shall in particular
estabhsh both the procedure to be follorved for the phascs lcadrng to mtegratron and a trmeframe
for achieving that arm The European Councrl shall take the necessan- decisions on the basrs of
reports submitted b1'the WEU and the European Union."
(c) Artrcle J.4.3 should read
"Until the objectives lard do*n rn paragraph 2 have becn achieved, the Uruon confers upon the
Wcstem European Union (WEU), ln pursuance of this Treaty', the task of takrng decrsrons *'rth
defence implications on behalf of the Unron and of elaborating and implementrng actrons rcsultrng
from them In partrcular these shall include permanent observation of cnsrs srtuations, Petersberg
tasks (humanitanan tasks, rcscuc tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces rn crisrs
managcment, including pcacemakmg) and the elaboration of a corrrmon armaments pohcy "
(d) Aruc\e J 4 4 should read:
"Where thc WEU acts in pursuance of Artrcle J 4 3. rt shall. in agrccmcnt rvrth the rnstitutions of
the European Unton, take care to ensure that all WEU assocratc mcmbcr. assocrate partner and
observer states particrpate fullv. uithin the limits of therr status in the WEU. in the WEU plan-
nrng and decrsron-makrng procedure.
The WEU Councrl shall take action rvithrn thc mearung of the precedrng paragraphs in response
to a request from anv WEU member. associatc membcr, associate partner or observer state, or to
an rnitiative of the WEU Secretary'-General ''
(e) Article J.4.5 should rcad
"The provrsions of this Trcaty concerrung constructive abstention shall be applied bv analogv to
decistons taken b1,the WEU u,ithrn the mearung of this Artrcle. The WEU rvill vcrrfi, u'hethcr thc
provtsions of the modified Brusscls Treatl' need to be adapted as a rosult. At the request of a
member state. the decrsron of the WEU Council shall be taken at head of state or governmcnt
level "
fl Cvrcnt Article J.4 3 is to be deleted.
(g/ Artrcles J 4 4 and J 4 5 areto remain unchanged and are to bc rcnumbered J.4.6 andJ.4.7.
(h) Current Artrcle J 4 6 rs to be deleted.
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2. Drau'up. in conlunctron rvrth the competent mstitulons of the European Uruon. a document on
the progressrve integratron of the WEU assocrate member. associate partner and observcr states m a
common secunty and defence sy'stem under the ausplces of the European Uruon: this documcnt should
comprise the follorvrng components.
(a) the elaboration of a rvhite paper outlining a common defence policy' concept m pursurt of the
corrrmon securltv mterests of all 28 WEU countries;
(b) a gradual upgradrng of the status of thc WEU associate member. associate partner and
observer countrres,
(c) lhe progressive particrpation of the WEU assocrate members and associate partners in the
rvork of the CFSP in the framework of the European Unron.
(d) an assessmcnt, in agreement wrth NATO, of the rmphcations for rmplementation of the CJTF
conccpt of rnstitutronal convergence between WEU and the EU.
(e) the partrcrpation of the WEU Secrctarl'-General m all meetmgs of the Councrl of Ministers of
the Unron and of the European Councrl at which matters concernlng the CFSP are discussed;
(fl clar.ftcatron of the rssucs conccrnlng the future form of parliamentary control over European
defence through a dcmocratrc European supervisorv bodl' composed of natronal parhamentarians,
in rvhrch representatives of thc Assemblv of WEU rvould partrcrpate.
(g) a decision on thc components of thc modrfied Brussels Treaty lrhrch, m addrtron to thc mutual
assistance clause contained rn Article V and the clause on cooperatron wrth NATO contarned rn
Artrcle IV, should be rncorporatcd rn the Treatl'on Europcan Union,
(h) identificatron of those statcs that are able and rvrlling to accede to a Treatl, on European
Uruon enhanced by the essential components of the modrfied Brussels Treaty and of those that the
European Union is prepared to admrt,
3 Strcngthen the WEU Plannrng Cell by grvrng rt a polrtrcal drmensron and propose to the European
Unton that the Cell should be assigned the tasks of the envrsaged pohcl' planning and early warning
capabrhtv undcr thc CFSP or, failing this, ensure that WEU too can submrt proposals concerning the
uork of thc CFSP plannrng unrt,
4 Make sure that the rncorporatron of a flexrbrlrty clause on closer cooperatlon among a group of
states serves thc purposc of a common European defence, accommodatlng as many European states as
possrble that msh to be part of it,
5 Report to the Assembly' on devclopments rn the Councrl's relations rvith the Unrted Natrons and
the OSCE and make strong representatlons to both those organrsations pointing out that thev mav have
recourse to WEU ln cnsls sltuatrons for the purpose of conducting opcratrons in accordance ruth a
mandate issued by crther,
6. Ensure that rn future rt convevs rts annual report to the Assembly on trme.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Mr Antretter, Rapporteur and Mrs Squarcialupi, co-Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
I In the oprnion of the French Foreign Min-
ister, Herv6 de Charette, 1997 is ayear of crucial
decrsronsr Thrs rs the year in whrch the govem-
ments of the membcr states of the Atlantic Alli-
ance and the Europcan Union have set them-
selves the ob.;ective of arnvmg at agreement on
far-reaching reforms in Euro-Atlantic coopera-
tion on secunty and making considerable quali-
tative progress torvards European politrcal inte-
gration. The success or failure of these endeav-
ours may be of decisive signrficance for the
future of European securitv and for mtemational
relations far into the 2 I st centun'
2. The intergovernmental conference on the
revlslon of the Treaty on European Unron is sup-
posed to reach agreement on a comprehensive
reform of the Treaty rn trmc for thc European
Councrl's ministerial summit meeting in Amster-
dam on 16 and 17 June 1997. One of the most
diffrcult sub.lects concerns revrslng the condrtions
for the cornmon forergn and security policy
(CFSP) rvhrch. m accordance rvith the wishes of
the majorrtl' of member states, should pave the
way for a common European defence policy rvith
the objectrve of achreving a common defence.
The draft revrsed Treatl' outlme issued by the
Netherlands Presrdency of the European Uruon
on 20 March 1997 therefore contains a clause m
whrch the gradual integratron of WEU in the
European Umon rs set forth as an oblectrve under
the Treaty. To that end, Belgrum, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg and Sparn submitted a
three-phase plan to the intergovernmental confer-
ence at the end of March2.
3. The goal of brrnging a European defence
policl' under the aegis of the European Union m
the medium to long tcrm must, among other
things, be aligned rn'ith the objective of the
NATO member states as declared by the mlnrs-
I See the Mrnister's address of 22 latrary
journalists accredrted to WEU.
2 For full text see appendix.
terral meeting of the North Atlantic Council on
3 June 1996 to develop the European secuntv
and defence identitl, wrthrn the Atlanfic Alhance.
It is partrcularlv srgnrficant that the correspond-
rng NATO commuruqu6 describes WEU's role in
thrs context as follou's
"Takmg full advantage of the approved
CJTF concept, this identity will be
groundcd on sound milrtary principles and
supportcd by' appropriate militarv planning
and permrt the creatron of militarily coher-
ent and effective forces capable of opera-
trng under the political control and
strategic direction of the WEU."
4. Thrs leads one to ask u'hether NATO, the
European Union and their member governments
have not manoeuvred thcmsclves into a conflrct
of arms regardrng their ideas about WEU's
future role as. accordmg to thc Franco-German
proposals convet'ed m untmg to the Irish Presi-
dencl' of the European Union on 9 December
1996 b1'the Presrdent ofFrance and the Chancel-
lor of the Federal Repubhc of Germany, the
European Councrl should be grven overall com-
petence to set gurdehnes for WEU The tenor of
these proposals rs reflected in each ofthe outhnes
for a draft revlslon of the Treaty' issued by the
Irish and Netherlands Presrdencres. and they' also
feature in the abovementroned plan to integrate
WEU in the European Union in phases
5. The significance of the subordrnatron of
WEU to the European Council's competence to
define gurdelines becomes clear rvhen one consrd-
ers that the European Councrl mcludes five
member states u'ith full voting nghts, none of
ri'hich is a signatorl' of the modrfied Brussels
Treatl' (namely, Austria, Denmark, Frnland, Ire-
land and Sx'eden) and four of which (Austrra,
Finland, Ireland and Srveden) are not members of
NATO The plan to subordinate WEU also
poses the problem of relatrons u'ith the three
NATO member states that do not belong to the
European Unron but are associate members of
WEU, the countnes m questron berng Iceland,
Noru'ay and Turkel'.
199',7 to
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6 An even morc lmportant consrderatron is
hou'to muster common polrtrcal u'rll among the
European countrres u'rth rcgard to a common
forergn, security and defence poho' The attempt
to compensate for the absence of common politr-
cal urll solelr'b1'makrng changes m mstrtutronal
structures. for instance b1' brrngrng rn quahfied
malontv votlng. creatmg nerv analvsrs and plan-
nrng uruts. appointrng a ''Mr CFSP", merging
rnstrtutrons or subordrnating one organrsatron to
anothcr. could casrll- mrsfire
7 In practrcal polrtrcs. it continues to be ex-
trcmclr drfficult to define cofirmon aims and de-
crde on 
.lornt actron A recent eramplc of thrs
u'as the European Uruon's rnabilitv to agree on a
common pohcv rcgardrng Chrna Neither u'as it
able to request WEU to lntervenc rn the Albanran
crisis But even the WEU Councrl rtsclf farlcd to
respond to the appeal for hclp from thc Albanran
Gol'ernment and to Recommendatron 609 on the
sttuation rn Albania s'hrch u'as adoptcd b1' the
Assembly's Standing Commrttee Drfficultrcs of
this nature have repeatedll' lcd to a sltuatlon m
uhrch polrtrcal action is often taken outsrdc the
instrtutronal frameu'ork of the rntcrnatronal org-
anisatrons responsrble for deahng u'rth problcms
that fall u'rthrn therr specific remrt There are a
numbcr of cramples of thrs such as the attempts
to scnd an multrnatronal protection force to Al-
bania undcr Itahan lcadcrshrp. the Bosnia Con-
tact Groupt. ths negotrations conducted rvith
Turkcv b1' the foreign minrstcrs of five EU mem-
ber statcsr (u'rth no involvement of the Presi-
dencv of the EU Councrl or the European Com-
mrssron). or the French proposal to hold talks
urth Russra over planncd NATO enlargement m
a confcrence of five po\\'crs
8 All this shoxs hou' drfficult rt rs to rec-
oncrle the institutronal frameu'ork u'rth thc rcah-
tics of polrtical urll and po\\'er polrtrcs at all
trmcs. Further problems arise becausc thc mcm-
ber states are at various stages m thetr readrncss
to movc ahead uith European rntegratron in all
3 Its mcmbcrs are representatlves of the United
States. Russra. the Unrted Krngdom, France and
Gcrmany
t Thc forcrgn mlnlsters of France. Germanl'. the
Unrted Krngdom. Spain and Ital1" 
- 
see the
F-rankJirrter.-11 lgemetne Zettung, 6 February 1997.
areas at the same speed and to the samc dcgrcc.
Haung recognrscd thrs, the partlclpants rn the
lntergovernmental conference are tn'rng to solvc
the problem b1'rncludrng a "flexrbrlrtl'clause" rn
the Treatl,on European Unron Its pulpose rs to
make it possiblc for a group of European Unron
mcmbcr states to move ahead ruth polrtrcal inte-
gratron rn specrfic areas more qurckly' than the
other member countries rvrthout the latter bcing
able to block this although thev can at any time
decrde to lorn thrs form of closer cooperation
Although a number of pornts still remarn to be
clanfied as regards horv such a flexibilrtl, clause
u'rll u'ork. thc majorrtv of member states take the
viex' that closcr coopcration rvrthin the institu-
tional framcu'ork of thc European Unron should
become a realrtr'
9 Whrle mstrtutrons are no substrtute for
polrtical u'ill, the \\'at- m x'hich the archrtecture
of the European organlsatrons responsrblc for a
conunon forergn, secunt)'and defencc pohcv rs
structured is nevertheless important rn order to
ensure that joint political decrsrons are imple-
mcnted as smoothlv as possrble It is therefore
csscntral to srmplifi' and improve the relevant
proccdures and thrs should be a major ob.lectrve
of thc lntergovernmental conference. It is the
Rapporteurs' rntcntron to make a contrrbutron to
thrs oblectrve b1' submitting specrfic proposals
l0 Thc smooth mnnrng of the European rnstr-
tutlons rs an csscntlal prcrcqursite for the Euro-
pcan Unron's expansron to the east and the south.
Accessron ncgotrations rvrth apphcant countries
are due to start six months aftcr the close of the
intergovernmental conference
II. A review of attempts to date to cover all
aspects of the common foreign and security
policy in a revised Treaty on European Union
1. Redefining the purpose, tasks
andfunctions of the CFSP
I I The member countrres of the Europcan
Unron, WEU and the Atlantrc Alliance are
broadlr' ln agrecment in therr assessmcnt of the
current secuntv sltuatlon. There is scarceh, any
drfference of oprnron among them about the fact
that Europe's external secuntl'today and for the
forcsccable future rs less threatened by the dan-
ger of an attack on thc terrrtonal rntegrrty of an1'
one member state than bv various other forms of
crisrs srtuatron u'hrch. rvrth the exception of the
Balkan conflrct, anse in the maloritv of cases rn
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reglons outside Europe Alongsrde polrtical cri-
sls management, such conflrcts mat, rcqurre the
deplovmcnt of militarv mcans for humarutanan
and rescuc tasks and peacekeepmg tasks but also
for tasks of combat forces in cnsrs management
and for peacemakrng on the basis of a mandate
from thc Unrted Natrons
12 Neu' forms of threats to external secunt)'
such as those inherent in organrsed rnternatronal
cnme. various tlpes of cross-border terrorism.
the illegal prohfcration of rvcapons of mass de-
struction. the mrgratron of large groups of
people, environmental disastcrs and the phe-
nomenon of rcligious issues findrng cxpresslon m
violencc. call for fresh thinkrng on horv ther-can
be tackled They could result m the disappear-
ance of thc rrgrd divisron of tasks under the sec-
ond prllar (common forergn and securitv policl)
and the thrrd prllar (cooperatron on lustrce and
internal affairs).
13 Thrs does not mcan that the need to be able
to defend the rntegritv of the mcmber states of the
Alhance effectivelv rn thc future has norv lost all
its rclevance Evcn'one agrees that because of
thc rrsks that strll remain, a sufficrent mrlrtan'
capability has to be presen'ed so that the mutual
assistance clauses rn the Washmgton and modr-
fied Brussels Treaties remain viablc
14 What rs neu' hou'ever is the rdea that a
guarantee of thc tcrntorial rntcgrrtv of the Euro-
pean Uruon as u'ell should also be firmly en-
trenched rn thc rcvised Treatl, Thrs rs currentlv
the subject of negotiatron at thc rntergovernmen-
tal conferencc According to the draft Trea['
changcs proposed bv the Nctherlands Presidency
on 20 March 1997. a neu' version of Artrcle J
rvould read:
"The Union and rts Member States shall
define and rmplcment a common forergn
and security policv. covermg all arcas of
foreign and securrtv policl', the oblectives
of u'hich shall be
to safeguard the common values. fun-
damental mtcrests. rndepcndence and
integnty of the Union rn conformty
wrth the prmaples of the Uruted Na-
ttons Charter.' .." .
15. Somc member states go evcn further and
are m favour of the concept of the rnvrolabrlrtv of
the European Uruon's extcrnal borders bcrng
estabhshcd rn the Treatl'. Greece in partrcular rs
pushrng for thrs But rn vreu' of the contrnumg
dispute betu'een Greecc and Turker- and of the
plan to admrt Cvprus to the Union. rt rs doubtful
rvhcther it lvould bc u'rsc, not to sav fcasrble- to
go further than thc u'ordrng proposed by' the
Netherlands Presrdcno,. The rvordrng of the
paragraph m questlon rvrll have repcrcussrons not
only' for the EU's future relations urth Turkey'
but also for rts opcnlng torvards ccntral and east-
ern Europe and rts relatrons u'ith Russra
16. Thrs issue rs closely, hnkcd to proposals to
includc a polrtrcal sohdantv clause m the Treatv
Under thc Netherlands' draft rcvlston of thc
Trea[', thc neu' Article J rvould contarn the fol-
lorving provlslon'
"The member states shall u'ork togethcr to
cnhance and develop their mutual polrtrcal
sohdaritl' "
17 Furthermore, rn a lornt letter to thc Irish
Presidcnc.v of 9 Deccmber 1996. thc German
Chancellor and French Presrdent sard that "the
EU member states have a commrtment to act m
concert and to dcmonstrate political sohdaritr.rn
rmplementing European actions, and thus also to
rcnounce all counterproductil'e actron"
l8 There is no doubt that thc drfficultics
involved in elaboratrng a common foreign and
securitv pohcl' have not drmmrshcd smce thc
entn' mto force of the Maastricht Treatl' What
can be done to cngender common politrcal rvill in
Europe urth rcgard to forergn and security pol-
icyr 5o far the answers glvcn ln response to thrs
highly charged politrcal qucstron have been al-
most cxclusively of an institutional and proce-
dural nature. For instancc. in a speech on
17 February 1997. Wemcr Ho1.er, Mrnistcr of
Statc at the German Mmrstn' of Forergn Affarrs
and thc Fcderal Repubhc's representatr\.'c at the
rntergovernmental confercnce. describcd Ger-
man\"s goals in thrs connection as follou's
"We rvant to frcc the common forcign and
secuntv pohcl' from the strartlacket of the
unanrmity' requlrement We also rvant to
grve it a face and a voice b1' appointing a
CFSP Secretary'-General u'ho rvould be
ansu'crable to the Councrl and u'ho could
t The proposcd amendments are sholvn in italics
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prepare Councrl decisions more effectivelv
and make thcm more transparent. In addi-
tion there should be an rndependent opera-
tronal workrng urut for foreign pohcy."u
19 In their loint lettcr of 9 December 1996 to
the Irish Presidencv, the French President and the
German Chancellor set forth the Franco-German
position and called for:
"1. The establishment in Brussels of a
permanent loint u'orkrng urut (Analysis
and Plannrng Unrt) as part of the Council
Secretanat, consrstmg of staff from the
Member States, the Commissron, WEU
and the Secretariat. It should plav a cen-
tral role ln prepanng and implementmg
Councrl and Politrcal Commrttee decisions,
and should present these bodres with, in
partrcular, anah'ses, recommendattons and
strategies in order to provrde a common
basis for thc consultations of the forergn
ministers... "
Thel' further suggested that.
Measures should also be taken to
loosen the consensus prrncrple. We should
therefore make greater use of malorrty'
votrng on the CFSP too, thrs should be-
comc the rule for rmplementation decrsrons
rn partrcular The European Councrl,
uhich represents the Uruon's supreme
polrtrcal lvrll. should, hou'ever, contlnue
rvith the prrncrple of consensus voting
Thrs also applies to Council pohcy deci-
sions and to secuntv and defence in gen-
eral.
Decision-makrng could also bc further
eased if we basically agreed that rn the
CFSP an 'abstention' u'ill not stand rn the
u'a1' of a decrsron even ln cases u'here
unanimitv remalns obligatory'. Each
member state could, by' means of this
'constructrve abstcntion'. express lts res-
ervatrons torvards ccrtam decisrons rvith-
out hmdenng lornt Europcan action.
6 Speech to the European Forum rn Petersberg, Bonn
- 
''Towards a securit_v and defence policy for the
European Unron"
3 Moreover, we require greater conti-
nurty, as well as a 'face' and 'vorce' for
the CFSP Our partners rn the world often
u'onder u'ho their forergn policy
'counterpart' rn the European Union is.
Wc therefore propose that the member
state govemments agree to entrust rvrth
thrs task a person wrth the necessary pol-
itrcal qualification. Thrs person rvould be
responsrble to the Councrl and rvould re-
port to it at regular intervals and, on re-
quest, also to the Europcan Council.
He or she would support the Council on all
CFSP matters [and] head the Anall'sis and
Planning Unit.
In our vrew we should look at two differ-
ent optrons
to either create a specrfic post whose
occupant u'ould carry out his or her
functions in close coordination with the
Secretarl'-General of the Council,
- 
or to charge that person with headrng
the General Secretariat. In this case we
rvould have to rcdefine the Secretary-
General status and function and trans-
fcr hrs or her tlprcal tasks to a Deputy
Sccretan'-General
So as to guarantee the coherence offoreign
pohcl'as a u'hole, the Commrssion shall be
full1' rnvoh'ed in CFSP elaboration and
rmplementation...."
20. Elaborating on the Irish Presidencv's draft
proposals of 5 December 1996. the Netherlands
Presidencl'endeavours to give substance to some
of the rdeas that u'ere put foru'ard, on u'hich
there are strll differences of opinion, in neu' Art-
rclcs J 7, J 12 and J.l4 and in a Declaration on
the Frnal Act of the Confcrence The proposed
wordmg for this Declaration reads:
"l A policy plannrng and early warrung
capabilitv shall be established in the Gen-
eral Secretarrat of the Councrl under the
responsrbility of its Secretary-General
Appropnate cooperation shall be estab-
lished rvith the Commrssron ln order to en-
10
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sure full coherence \\'ith the Unron's extcr-
nal economic and development pohcres
2. The tasks of the policl, plannrng and
earlv warning capabilrty,should include the
follorving
(a) monitoring and analvsrng develop-
ments in areas relevant to the CFSP:
(b) provrdrng assessments of the Union's
foreign and securrty policy rnterests and
identrf ing areas rvhere the CFSP could
focus in future.
(c) providing trmely asscssments and
earh, u'arning of events or srtuations rvhich
may'have significant repercussions for the
Unron's foreign and security policy, in-
cludrng potential polrtrcal crises;
(d) producing on request of either thc
Councrl or the Prcsrdencv or on its oun
mitiative, argued policl, options papers. to
be presented under the responsibilrtl'ofthe
Presrdencv as a contribution to pohcy
formulatron rn the Council, and rvhrch may
contain anal1'ses. recommendations and
strategies for the CFSP
3 The policy plannrng capabilrty, shall
consist of personnel draun from the Gen-
eral Secrctarrat, the Member Sates, the
Commrssron and the WEU
4. Any Member State or the Commis-
sion mav make suggestrons to the plaruung
capabilrtl,for rvork to be undertaken.
5 Member States and the Commrssion
rvrll assrst the pohcl' planning process bv
provrdmg, to the fullest extent possrble,
relevant informatron, rncluding confiden-
tral informatron "
2l It rs also proposed that, in a separate dec-
laration, WEU should express its readiness to
convey to the pohcy planning capabrlity, any in-
formatron it requrres for its rvork.
22. There rvould not really be any reason for
the WEU Assembly to comment on the appro-
priateness of thrs nerv institutlon were rt not for
the fact that rts tasks urll overlap, at least in part,
with those of the WEU Plannrng Cell and the
recently estabhshed Srtuation Ccntre. In addi-
tion, rt rs intended that WEU wrll take part rn the
work of the neu, polio' planning capabilitv as
members of rts olrn staff u'rll be seconded to rt
23 The necessary staff are to be taken from
the General Secretanat of the Council, the mem-
ber states, the European Commrssion and WEU.
Thc varrous hierarchrcal relations among the
staff of such a complicated unrt rarse doubts as
to u'hether it rvill be able to operate efficrentlr'.
As the example of the WEU Plannrng Cell
shou's, experts cannot take anl,action unless thel'
recelve the necessarl' political instructions In
the case of the proposed nerv policy' planning
capabilrty, any' instructions 
- 
assuming they' are
issued 
- 
lvould come from the General Secretar-
iat of the Councrl, the capital crtres, the European
Commission and WEU, making rt most unhkely'
that therr content rvill be consistent.
24 In order to avord duphcate structures and
grve a widcr rnterpretatron to the remrt contained
in the Maastricht Treatl', accordmg to u'hich
WEU is to elaborate and rmplement decrsrons
and actrons of the Unron rvhich have defence
imphcatrons, things could be simphfied by reas-
signing the tasks envrsaged for the nerv pohcy
plannrng capabrlrtl'to the WEU Planning Cell,
rvhich u,ould be grvcn a political drmensron for
thrs purpose. Holl'ever, if the governments de-
crde to go along urth the Franco-German pro-
posal regarding thc composition and tasks of an1,
nerv poho' plannrng unrt, it rl'ould at least have
to be establishcd that not only'the mcmber states
and the European Commrssron 
- 
as envisaged so
far 
- 
but WEU as well urll be able to submrt
proposals to thc urut in questron and prol'ide rt
with support during the planning process.
25. As regards the decisron-making mech-
anism, thc Netherlands Presrdencv has made a
pornt of incorporating the Franco-German
proposals for increased use of majoritl, votrng
and recourse to thc optron of constructrve
abstentron ln a new Artrcle J 12 rvhich reads:
"1. Decisrons under this Title shall be
takcn by the Council acting unanimously'
Abstentions by members present ln person
or represented shall not prevent the adop-
tron of such decrsrons
When abstalnlng ln a vote, anv member of
the Council may quahfr' rts abstention by
making a formal declaratron under the pre-
sent subparagraph. In that case, rt shall
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not be obhged to applv the decrsron. but
shall accept that the decrsron commits the
Uruon. In a sprnt of mutual sohdarrtl'. the
Member State concerned shall refram from
anv action hkell'to conflict rvrth or rmpede
Union actlon based on that decrsron and
the other Member States shall respcct rts
posrtron. If the mcmbers of the Council
quahflrng their abstentron in thrs u'ay' rep-
rcscnt more than onc thrrd of thc votes
u'erghted ln accordance urth Artrclc
148(2) of the TEC. the decrsron shall not
be adopted
2. All dccrsions taken m the frameu'ork
of a common strategl', rncludrng decrsrons
to issue declaratrons or undertake de-
marches. shall be adopted b1' the Councrl
acting b1' a qualified malorrty'
Decrsions implcmcnting comrnon positions
or joint actrons shall also bc adopted b1,
the Council actrng b1,'qualified ma1ont\'.
The votes of the members of the Councrl
shall be rverghted rn accordance rvrth Art-
rcle 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the
European Commurutv. For their adoptron,
dccrsrons shall requrre at least 62 votcs rn
favour. cast b1'at least l0 members
Thrs paragraph shall not appl1' to dcci-
srons havrng mrlrtan' or defcnce rmphca-
tlons
26. These provisions u'ould be of partrcular
sigruficancc for WEU rf the IGC xcre to agrce to
grve the European Councrl ol'erall competence to
set gurdehnes for WEU. The problem of thc
specific impact thrs u'ould have on thc role of thc
five EU membcr states that do not belong to
WEU rs drscusscd in the next section
27 Under the terms of ne*' Artrclcs J 7 and
J 14, the status of the Secretary'-General of the
Councrl but also of the Commission uill be en-
hanccd so as to give thc CFSP a face and vorce
vrs-a-'"'rs the outsidc lvorld. Provrsion rs also
made for the Councrl to appoint a specral repre-
sentativc u'ith a mandate for partrcular pohcv
rssues u.henever rt deems lt necessar)' A11 thcse
vanous proposals shorv that there rs still no uni-
form hne on these matters at the rntergovernmen-
tal conferencc
28. The question of rvhether and to $'hat ex-
tent WEU should become rnr,'olved in the debate
on the appomtment of a person who rvould coor-
drnate CFSP actrvrtres and grve them the neces-
san lmpetus should be drscussed by' the Assem-
bly srnce the outcome of this debate rvrll have
consrdcrable repercusslons for the futurc working
relatronshrp betu'een WEU and the European
Unron
29 The tasks to be carricd out b1'the pcrson
referred to above could be assrgned to the Secre-
tary-Gencral of WEU. uho u'ould thus acquirc
an enhanced polrtical status enabling him to
make an effectrve contributron to better coordr-
nation betu'een the rnstrtutions of the European
Union and WEU This rvould also avoid the need
for nerv staffing and adminrstratrve structures.
The questron of w'hether one person unrting the
jobs of Secretan'-General of WEU and a "Mr
CFSP" should be pursued as a polrtrcal goal de-
pends of course on the form of futurc rclations
betu'cen WEU. the European Union and NATO
2. The plan for the phased integration
of llEU in the European Union
30 In vreu' of the obligatrons into r,r'hich the
WEU member countrics cntered rlhen thel'
srgned the modrfied Brusscls Treatr', the central
one berng a corrrmon defence, and the fact that I I
member states of the European Unron also be-
long to thc Atlantrc Alhancc. consrderatron must
once agarn be grven to the question of wh1, it
should prove so diffrcult to incorporate the con-
cept of a corrrmon defence in thc Treatv on Euro-
pean Union u'hen this u'as possible rn the frame-
u'ork of NATO and WEU
3 I There are scveral reasons:
the first rs that five EU mcmber states
have drfficultf in accepting thc idea of
a cornmon dcfcnce regardless of horv it
u'ould bc organrsed.
- 
second, somc countries, rn partrcular
the Unrted Krngdom and Dcnmark, do
not \\'ant the European Umon to take on
rcsponsibrlitl' for defence,
third. I I EU mcmber states have de-
crdcd with others rn NATO that the
European securrtl, and defence identrty'
should be developcd rvrthin the Atlantrc
Alhance.
fourth, three European member states
of NATO do not belong to the Euro-
pean Unron:
t2
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fifth, there are strll no clear and unr-
form ideas about the final oblectrve of
European rntegration, u'hrch also m-
cludes securltv and defence;
sixth, the conscquenccs 
- 
for the At-
lantrc Alliance, relations rvith Russra.
EU plans to take in ncrv members and
relations rvrth those European NATO
states that (strll) do not belong to the
EU 
- 
of transforming the Union into a
defence communrtv have not vet been
examrned and explaincd.
32 Regardlcss of these outstandrng problems,
a group of countnes led by France and Germany
u'ants the intergovcrnmental conference to pro-
duce a revised Treatl' estabhshrng specific mrle-
stones in a step-by-step process leadrng to full
mtegratron of WEU in the European Unron. at
the cnd of u'hrch the Union ts to be responsrble
for all aspects of a common secuntv and defence
33. Elaboratrng on one of the Irish Prcsr-
deno"s draft Treatl' proposals of 5 December
1996. the Netherlands Presidcncl' put fonrard
the follorving amended vcrslon of thc first tu'o
paragraphs of currcnt Artrclc J 4 on 20 March
1997
"1 The common forcrgn and secunt\,'
poho' shall rnclude all questions relatmg
to thc sccurrtl' of thc Unron, including the
progrcssrve [u'ord deleted] framing of a
common dcfence pohc,v [supported by a
corrrmon armaments policl,]. in the per-
spcctrve of [u'ords deleted] a common de-
fcncc.
Questions referred to rn this article shall
rnclude humarutarian and rescue tasks-
peacekeepmg tasks and tasks of combat
forces in crisis managemcnt, rncludrng
peacemaking
2. The Western Europcan Uruon (WEU)
rs an integral part of thc dcvetopment of
the Unron s'rth thc objcctrvc of gradual
intcgratron of the WEU into thc Umon.
Thc Unron shall accordrnglv foster closer
rnstitutronal rclatrons ivith it.
The Unron urll avail rtself of [word de-
letcdl the WEU [uords deleted] to elabor-
ate and implement decisions and actions of
the Union ri'hich have defence imphca-
tions."
34 Horvever, in a letter of 2l March to the
Netherlands Presidencl' of the Europcan Unron,
the German Foreign Minister proposed thc fol-
lou'ing text rvhich rvent consrderablr' further and
had been agreed b1' Belgrum. France, Gcrmanl,',
Italr', Luxembourg and Spain:
"1 The common foreign and securitv
policr shall rnclude all questions relating
to the securitv of the Uruon, including the
progresslve framrng of a common defence
pohcf in the pcrspective of a common de-
fcncc
The common defence polio' shall includc
the framing of prrnciples, aims and means
in the defence field.
The Pctersberg tasks (humanrtanan tasks.
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks. tasks of
combat forces in crrsis management, ln-
cluding peacemaking) shall bc thc first cx-
pressron of a common sccuriry'and defence
policl'. Armaments pohcl' shall bc an tn-
tegral part of the common defence pohcl..
2 The Westcrn European Uruon (WEU)
ls an mtegral part of thc development of
the European Unron and Member States
have thcrcfore madc rt their aim to mte-
grate the WEU progressivelv into the
European Uruon Thev rvrll rvork actrvell-
rn the Unron and the WEU to achreve that
alm. Integratron shall be achiel'ed ln sev-
cral stages u'hrch shall be defined in
grcater detail in a Protocol appended to
this Treatl' The first stage shall com-
mcnce rvith the entn' mto force of thrs
Treaty'; the transitron to the furthcr stagcs
shall be determrned by Decisron of the
Council, meetmg at Hcad of Statc and
Govemmcnt level
Thc Unron rvrll avail itself of thc WEU to
elaborate and rmplemcnt dccrsrons and ac-
trons of the Union u'hich have defence
rmphcatrons.
The competencc of the European Council
to cstabhsh guidehnes rn accordance u'ith
Artrclc J l(b) shall also obtain in respect
of thc WEU.
I3
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The Councrl shall. on thc basrs of general
guidehnes lard doun b1' thc European
Councrl, cnsurc unrform and conststcnt
actron on the part of thc Unron and of thc
WEU and shall rn agreemcnt x'rth the
WEU adopt the necessan' practrcal ar-
rangcmcnts ''
3-5 In addrtron. the same countrres submitted
to the IGC a separate document contaming four
artrclcs scttrng out three phases for the integra-
tron of WEU rn thc European UnronT During the
thrrd and last phasc
"thc rntegratron proccss shall bc completed
b1
transferrrng thc compctcnces of the
institutrons and bodrcs of the WEU to
the relevant rnstrtutrons of the EU and
mcorporatrng other remarnlng WEU
structures into thc EU.
mcorporatrng thc assrstancc guarantee
lard doun rn Artrcle V of the modrfied
Brussels Treatl' rnto the Treatt' on
European Uruon or an addrtronal proto-
col to the Treatl rvhrch should contain
the approprrate rnstrtutronal mccha-
nrsms for the cooperatron of participa-
trng member states on issues of tcrnto-
rral dcfcncc making use of the politrco-
mrlrtary structures of the EU. In the
proccss. thc nght of each member statc
of thc Unron not to partrcrpate in an
asslstance mechanrsm shall be re-
spcctcd At thc samc trmc. a dnftrng
apart of thc defcnce commrtments rn
the EU and NATO. ri'hrch riould
u'eaken thc transatlantrc secuntl' hnk.
must be avorded,
all Contracting Partres termrnatrng the
modrfied Brussels Treatv on the dal,thc
assrstance mechanrsm contamed rn thc
Trcaty'on European Unron or an addr-
tional protocol to this Treatl' enters mto
force for them;
rntcnsrfr'mg drrect relations betrvcen the
Union and NATO m order to further
dcvelop the cooperation previousl), e*-
istrng bctwcen the WEU and thc Alh-
ance."
36 The first phase u'ould begrn upon cntrv
into force of the rcvised Treatr'. x'rth each phasc
lastrng about three vears When anall'srng thc
rcvrsed u'ordmg proposed for Artrcle J 4 and thc
assocrated phased integratton plan, the first
qucstron that comes to mind rs u'hv rts mrtrators
are makrng thrs proposal u'rth so lrttle trme to go
beforc the schedulcd completion of the intergov-
ernmcntal confercncc grven that it is bound to
mcct u'rth outrrght opposrtlon from the Unrted
Krngdom and that Dcnmark. Finland. Ireland and
Sucdcn ha'v'c cxpresscd rcscrvations about it
Neverthclcss. thcrc are reports that four countnes
- 
Austrra. Grcecc. the Nctherlands and Portugal
- 
have come dou'n in favour of this proposal
from thc group of Srr.
37 . Furthermorc, thc objccttves of thts mttta-
trve are not clear from the u'ordrng of thc pro-
posed text. The reference to spectfic arcas ln
s'hrch a defence pohcv u'ould bc rmplcmcntcd
and the proposal to rnclude a reference to a
coffrmon armaments policf in Artrcle J 4 rvould
suggest that the proponents' matn concem ts to
set up a corrrmon dcfence in the frameu'ork of thc
Europcan Unron
3tt Hou.el'er. rt rs conunon knou'ledge that I I
EU membcr statcs u'ere party to the NATO de-
crsron takcn rn Bcrhn to burld the European
secuntv and dcfcnce rdcntttv ruthm the Alhance
Therefore. rn ordcr to prevent a conflict betrveen
thesc tu'o drffcrent ob.;cctivcs. arrangements rvtll
have to be made to cnablc the three NATO
countrres that are not EU members and are cur-
rentl1'WEU assocratc members 
- 
Iceland. Nor-
x'av and Turkey 
- 
to partrcrpatc fulh' ln a com-
mon defence. ln this connectron. Artrcle 2 of thc
phased integration plan merelv states. that
"proccdures shall be developed u'htch urll cnsurc
that the participatorl' nghts of the assocratc
members of WEU are full1' takcn rnto ac-
count" but does not erplain u'hat form these pro-
ccdurcs u'rll take
39 Even more rmportant holvever is the
problem of hou- to guarantee the participatton of
Denmark and the four states u'ith a tradrtron of
neutralitr' ln a conxnon dcfcnce u'tthrn the Euro-
pean Unron Thc phased integratron plan pro-
poses that durrng thc third phase the mutual as-
sistance clause contamed rn Artrclc V of theFor full text see appcndrx
l4
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modified Brussels Treatl' should be rncorporated
rn thc Treatl'on Europcan Union or an addrtronal
protocol to the Treaty It even goes on to state
that the right of each member state of the Union
not to partrcrpate rn an assrstance mechanrsm is
to be respected.
40 Thrs means that thc mutual assistance ob-
hgahon, li'hich rs the mainstay' of a common de-
fence, lvould merelv be optronal rn the European
Union If thrs rs mtended to take account of the
spccrfic problems of Denmark and of Austna,
Fmland, Ireland and Srveden, it lcads one to ask
rihat purposc rlould be scrved by' transfernng the
mutual assrstance clause from WEU to the EU.
The sole effect of an optronal mutual asslstance
clausc lvould bc to u'eaken the idea of a common
European defencc bccause, as the nght not to
partrcipate in a common defence lvould bc cx-
presslv guaranteed. countrres other than those
mentroned above mrght also latch on to the idea
ofrejectrng thc clause rn questron
41. The authors of the phascd rntegratron plan
themseh'es recognrse the need to avoid any drift-
rng apart of thc defencc commitments in the
European Union and NATO, rvhich n'ould
weaken thc transatlantrc sccuritl, hnk Yet thrs rs
precisely what u'ould happen rf thc mutual assrs-
tance clause u'as optional Thrs problem con-
cerns not only thc five EU mcmbcr states that do
not belong to WEU but also affects those benefit-
rng from the enlargement of the Unron tou'ards
central and eastern Europe. To avord anv drffr-
cultres arismg wrth Russra, the Europcan Union
might be temptcd to allorv certarn central and
eastern European countnes to join the EU rvith-
out their havrng to subscribe to the mutual assts-
tance obligation. Thrs u,ould result m thc Euro-
pean Unron consisting of countnes rvrth drffcrent
categories of membership and u'ould frustrate the
goal ofa comrnon European defence.
42 If the purpose behrnd the phased integra-
tion plan rs to create a comrnon European de-
fence, the mutual assistance clause contained rn
Artrcle V of the modified Brusscls Treatv must
be incorporated rn the Treatl'on European Uruon
and be brnding on all member statcs Moreover,
the EU should make rt clear at this stage that the
readiness of an applicant state to become a full
member of WEU ls one of the condrtions for en-
tr)'to the Europcan Union.
43 It is of course ri'holl1, conceivable that a
common defence could be lcft to NATO and a
hard core of EU member states. pror,'rdcd one
accepts that this rr,ill gir,'e nse to zones of van'rng
degrces of secunty' u'rthrn thc European Unron
It rs hardll' hkel1', hou'ever. that thrs is u'hat thc
authors of thc phased intcgration plan rntcnd
should happen
44 The Rapporteurs are m favour of makrng
cvery effort to promote a common European de-
fence and strengthcn the transatlantrc partner-
ship. Thev take the uerv that m strivrng to attain
thrs goal, rt rs rmportant to crcate the proper
condrtrons as soon as possrble so as to mottvate
all thc EU mcmbcr states to take part unrcscn'-
cdll'rn a conxnon defcncc pohcv and a common
dcfence. The questron that has to be askcd rs
u'hether the Treatl proposals submiued so far at
the rntergovernmental conference are movlng ln
the rrght drrection for drauing closer to thc ultr-
matc goal.
45. In the Irish Presrdenc)' s draft proposals.
the folloivrng u'ording \\'as proposed for Artrcle
l4t
''The common forergn and securitv policl'
shall rnclude all questions rclating to thc
secunty of the Union. rncludrng the pro-
gresstve framing of a common defcncc
polrcl' rn the perspectrve of a common de-
.fence 
''
46 Thrs u'ordmg u'as taken ovcr bv the Neth-
crlands Presidencl,and by'the six countncs that
produced the phascd rntegration plan Those
countrics also u'ant a second subparagraph in-
cludcd reading:
"The common dcfcnce policl, shall rncludc
the framing of pnnciples. arms and means
in thc defence ficld".
47. In addrtion to the Pctcrsberg tasks. thel'
also propose that the Trcatv on European Uruon
should rncludc armaments polto', rvhich thc1,
descnbe as "an rntegral part of the common dc-
fence pohcy" Thc scope of a proposal such as
this becomes clear rn connectron u'ith the revrsed
u'ording of Artrcle J.4 3 rihich rs rntended to en-
able all the EU mcmber states to partrcrpate full1'
rn the elaboratron and implementation of decr-
srons and actrons of the Union refcrrcd to in
Artrclc J.4.1 Thrs u'ould give thc five WEU
observer states 
- 
Austria, Denmark. Frnland,
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Ircland and Snedcn 
- 
a legrtrmatc rrght. sub.lect
to certarn condrtrons. to be full1 rnvolr.'ed m drs-
cussrons urthrn Wcstern European Unron. tuth
all that implies Grantrng these countnes thrs
nght in specrfic areas of such rmportance rs
hable to go so far torvards accommodatrng therr
vttal mtercsts that rt rr-ould hardlv grve them anv
political rcason to particrpate rn even the central
feature of a common dcfcncc based on a mutual
asslstancc clausc. It rs thereforc ven' doubtful
that such an arrangement u'ould advance thc
cause of a corrrmon Europcan dcfence.
48 Thc revrsed x'ordrng of Artrcle J 4.2.
x'hich dcals urth the futurc rclatronshrp betu'ccn
WEU and the European Unron, merelv corrob-
oratcs thrs vreu', The vcrsron proposed b1' the
Insh Prcsrdeno'begms as follou's.
"The Western European Union (WEU) rs
an rntegral part of the developmcnt of thc
Uruon and thc Uruon shall accordrngll
fostcr closer rnstrtutional rclattons uith rt "
49 For a numbcr of reasons. this form of
riording rs a clear improvcmcnt on the text rn
force: therc rs a drrect hnk betu'ccn the first half
of the sentencc and the prcamble and Artrcle
VIII I of thc modrfied Brusscls Treatv The scc-
ond half places the rnstrtutrons of the Europcan
Unton undcr an obligatron to cooperate u'rth
WEU rnstrtutrons. somethrng uhrch has hrthcrto
not bccn cstabhshed bv trcatv To ensurc that
thesc provrsrons applv to a1l WEU instrtutrons.
rncludrng the WEU Asscmblr', a proposal could
be makc to rerrord this paragraph as follou s
"Thc Wcstcrn Europcan Uruon (WEU) ro-
gether wrth all tts tnsfituttoirs rs an inte-
gral part of thc dcvelopment of the Euro-
pean Unron . "
50 Hon'er,cr. thc u'ording proposed for this
paragraph rn thc amended version submitted bv
Bclgrum. Francc. Germanr'. Italr'. Luxembourg
and Sparn rcads
"The Wcstem European Unron (WEU) rs
an rntcgral part of thc dcvelopment of thc
Europcan Union and the Member Statcs
have thercfore made rt their aim to inte-
gratc the WEU progressivelv into thc
Europcan Unron Thcv urll rvork actrvelv
rn thc Union and thc WEU to achrer,'c that
arm Integratron shall be achreved ln sev-
eral stages uhrch shall be defincd tn
grcater dctarl rn a Protocol appcnded to
thrs Trcaty' The first stage shall com-
mence urth the entry mto force of this
Treatl'. the transrtron to the further stages
shall be determrned bv Dccrsron of the
Councrl meeting at Hcad of State and
Govcrnmcnt level."
51 Thrs phased integratron plan has to be
considered rn the overall contcxt of the revised
rvordmg proposed for thc second subparagraph
of Artrclc J 4 2 The Insh and Netherlands
Presrdencies have put fonvard the follorving tcxt
for thc sentence'
''Thc Union urll avarl rtself of thc WEU to
elaborate and rmplement decisions and ac-
trons of the Unron rlhrch have dcfence
rmphcations "
Thc proponents of the phased rntcgratron plan
add the follou'rng
"Thc compctence of the Europcan Council
to estabhsh gurdelmes rn accordance rvith
Artrcle J l(b) shall also obtarn in respect
of thc WEU
The Councrl shall. on thc basis of general
gurdchnes laid doun by the European
Councrl. ensure unrform and consrstent
actron on the part of the Union and of the
WEU and shall rn agreement rr th thc
WEU adopt thc nccessan' practlcal ar-
rangcments "
52 On the face of rt. it u'ould appear that the
intentron behrnd the replacement of "the Union
rcqucsts the Westcrn European Unron" br' "the
Unron ivill avarl rtsclf of the WEU" rs to give
WEU more polrtrcal frecdom of actron r,'rs-a-vis
thc European Uruon But this rs deccptive
53 The draft re\,'rsron maintams the principle
alreadv enshrrncd rn the Treatv rn force of not
glvmg WEU a gcncral mandate but mcrelv hav-
ing recourse to rt in specific cases Horlever. the
fact that srncc the entry into force of the Maas-
tncht Treatv the European Unron has onlv once
requested WEU to elaboratc and implement an
actron of the Unron *rth defence imphcations
shorvs hou drffrcult rt rs to reach agreement
u'ithin the European Unron u'hen it comes to
giving WEU a specific mandate. Thc case rn
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pomt conccrned a peace misslon to Africa to sct-
tle thc cnsls ln the Great Lakcs regronE
54 Evcn m the throes of the Albanran crrsrs.
no mandate from the Europcan Uruon \\'as glven
to WEU requestmg rt to u'ork out rval's of solv-
rng the crisis. rvhich posed a threat to tho entire
rcgiono As the crlsrs ln the Great Lakcs rcgion
shorvcd. drfficultres also arise xithrn WEU rtself
u'hen it comes to rcspondmg to a requcst from
thc European Unron and agreeing on a lornt plan
of actron Problcms of this naturc arc hable sen-
ouslv to undermrne the credibilitv of WEU as a
force for cnsls management.
55. The fact that the French Presrden*' of the
WEU Councrl held a loint scminar uith thc
European Uruon on 17 Aprrl 1997 at u.hrch cx-
perts studrcd the practrcal implementation of Art-
icle J 4 2 of the Trcatl' on European Union rs
thercforc a positive der,'elopmcnt The findrngs of
thc scmmar. about u'hrch the Assemblv has no
officral mformation. arc to be drscussed at the
meetrng of the WEU Council of Minrstcrs on l2
and l3 Ma1' 1997 rn Pans The Minrstcrs u,ould
also do uell to usc that occasion to discuss
u'hether the procedurc follou'ed to date of re-
course berng had to WEU on a case-b\'-case
basrs should not be complemcnted b1' glvmg
WEU a right to take initiatrves that u,ould be
clearly' u'rrtten rnto the Treatl'. Information that
has hou'ever filtercd through about the results of
the seminar gn'es lrttle causc to hope that
coordmation betu'ccn WEU and the EU in thrs
field rvrll bc anv easier in the future.
56 Accordrng to the proposal submittcd by'
the group of countries advocatrng the progressrve
integratron of WEU rn thc European Unron. the
Europcan Councrl's compctence to set gurdchnes
should also apply to WEU Furthermore. on the
basrs of such gurdehnes, thc European Councrl
n'ould ensure uruform and consistent actron on
the part of the Unron and of WEU This ivould
pose a considerablc problem because fivc coun-
trieslo would thus acqurre a rrght to rssue in-
structtons to WEU rrrthout therr havrng to sub-
t The European Union's mandate to WEU to set up a
polrce force for the tou'n of Mostar \1as ssued before
the Maastricht Treatl'entered rnto forcc.
e Atlantrc rVery.s. 28 March 1997
10 Austria, Dcnmark, Finland, Ircland and Su'edcn
scribe thc modrfied Brussels Trcatv and u'rthout
berng undcr anv obligatron to take part unrescrv-
edlr- ln all aspects of a common dcfencc On ac-
count of the contmumg apphcation in thrs area of
thc pnncrple of unanimrtr'. thcy u'ould bc ablc to
block or delal' anv dccrsron in the Europcan
Councrl.
57 It has horvevcr bcen proposed that thc op-
tion of "constructlvc abstention" rn a vote xould
opcrate in such cascs. Under thrs procedure.
even'member statc u'ould have thc possrbilitv of
cxprcsslng rts rcscn'atlons about a specific decr-
sion m a formal dcclaratron but rvould not be
able to prevent thc majoritv from takrng a decr-
sion. The proposal rs that rn the Treat\'. a ne\\'
Article J.12 u'ould specrfl, that rvhen a membcr
state al'arls rtself of the optron of constructrve
abstentron. rt u'rll not be obliged to apply the dc-
cisron but u'rll accept that thc decrsron commits
the Unron. In a spirit of mutual sohdarrtl'. the
member state concerncd rs to refrarn from anv
actron hkelv to conflrct u'rth or impede Uruon
action bascd on that dccisron and the othcr mem-
ber statcs are to respcct rts position. Horvcvcr,
the Nethcrlands draft rcvlslon of the Trcat)' pro-
poscs that if members of the Councrl quah$rng
therr abstention m thrs u'al' rcprescnt more than
one third of thc votcs. the decisron cannot be
adoptcd It rs not clear u'hether the provisions of
thrs nerv Artrcle on thc optron of constructrve
abstention arc also to appll to thc European
Council.
58. Even if that u'ere the casc. the procedure rs
strll a very complicated one that does not srm-
plifi'the dccisron-makmg proccss. But the big-
gest drau'back rn the concept as planned rs that it
is exclusrvclv for the statc concemed to decidc
rvhethcr or not rt avarls rtsclf of the optron of
constructivc abstention As a full member of the
Council. rt can usc cvcn'mcans at rts drsposal to
influcnce negotiatrons on the decrsion to bc takcn
and the content of that decrsron. Bv resortrng to
such means. rt can delar- the decrsron-makmg
proccss for some considerable time urthout ac-
tualh' having to grvc expresslon to rts reserva-
trons through constructive abstcntron u'hen it
comes to a votc If the state does not uish to
accept that a dccrsron is to be brndrng on the
European Unron. rt is free to prevent that
happening by votrng agamst rt
59. It can be rnferred from thc above that es-
tablishrng the pnnciple of thc Europcan Councrl
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havrng competence to set gurdelines rn WEU's
arca of responsrbrlrtv rs tantamount to makrng
too great a concesslon to the fil'e EU countnes
that have observer status m that Organrsatron.
As rt rs. rt rs ven. drfficult for decrsrons to be
takcn bccause agreement cannot be reachcd in the
Europcan Union earll'enough and WEU does not
takc anv rrutiatrves becausc it does not recerve a
remrt from the Unron The proposed ne\\'
arrangemcnts srll do nothrng to rmprovc thc
situatron
60 In all thrs. no thought has vct been given to
hou- thc European Councrl's competence to sct
guidehnes that applv to WEU can be reconcrled
u-ith thc fact that WEU's actrvrtres are based on
an rndepcndcnt treatv or to u'hcther such compe-
tcnce is compatrble uith the decrsrons taken b1'
NATO m Berhn rn June 1996 Thrs is of par-
trcular rclelancc to NATO making assets avarl-
able for mlsslons conducted under thc drrectron
of WEU in accordance rvith the CJTF concept.
The European mcmbers of NATO that do not
bclong to the European Unron 
- 
Iceland. Nonvav
and Turker' 
- 
naturallv have full partrcrpatron
and dccrsron-makrng rrghts m this contcxt cven rf
thev do not take part rn an1' WEU missrons In
contrast, the European Councrl's authontv can-
not ertcnd to those countnes even though thcl'
are assocratc membcrs of WEU
61. Speakrng at the Wrlton Park Conferencc
on 13 Fcbruary 1997. thc Bntrsh Permanent
Representativc to NATO and to WEU explarned
thc reasons bchrnd the decrsrons takcn by NATO
in Berlin as follori's
"The undcrstandrng behrnd last June's
Bcrhn communrqud rs that NATO rvill be
xrlhng and ablc to relcase scrvices and as-
sets to thc WEU provrded rt rs autono-
mous. ruth rts full members also mcmbers
of NATO Thrs polrtrcal fact has implica-
trons for thc Europcan Uruon and thcrcfore
thc defencc part of the mtergovernmcntal
confcrence. Thc European Uruon stands
to garn enormouslv rf rt can ask thc WEU
to take on an opcratron rn the confidcnce
that the WEU u'rll be able to acqurre from
NATO the headquartcrs and assets to take
that on urth the best prospects of success
But thc EU u'ould lose this benefit rf rt
subordrnated thc WEU NATO *'ould not
be urlhng to entrust rts assets to the EU
(rvhcre non-allies could block or influence
decrsrons on a mrlitary operation and alhes
hke Turkev and Nonvay u'ould have less
say) or to a WEU rvhrch 'ivas mcrell' an
agenc)'of the EU."
62 All thrs rs ven' much to the forc in the
minds of the authors of the phased rntegration
plan because thev clcarly' statc in Articlc 2 of
therr proposal to the IGC that as from thc first
phase of integratron. the European Councrl rvrll
politicalll' monitor the rmplementation of decr-
sions and actlons of the Unron urth defence rm-
phcatrons as claborated b1'WEU If this arrange-
ment \\'ere to be adopted, thc EU Councrl of
Mrnisters 
- 
in which member states that do not
belong to WEU have the same full votrng nghts
as the others 
- 
u'ould be grven polrtrcal control
over kev areas of WEU actruties. If that rvere
thc case. there uould no longer be any real need
for thc WEU Councrl to meet at the polrtrcal
lw'el. thus deprrvrng the WEU Asscmbl1,' of an
cxccutrve body ovcr u'hose activrtres It ls sup-
posed to erercisc polrtical control
3. The inclusion of Petersberg tasks in
the Treaty on European Union
and the ensuing consequences
63. The subordrnatron of WEU to thc Euro-
pean Councrl's competencc to set guidelines rs
also intcndcd to ensure among other thrngs that
the five EU member states that are not membcrs
of WEU but are u'illing to play a full part in Pct-
ersberg mlssrons marntarn thcrr nghts of consul-
tatron and codecision in this area Until nou'
these countnes have had no such rrghts ln
WEU's mternal dccisron-makmg process even
though thev arc prepared to contrrbute combat
forces to peacekccprng mrssions.
64 The WEU Councrl has been discussrng all
these problems for some trme but no satrsfacton'
solutions have 1,et bccn found In therr Madnd
Dcclaratron of 14 Novcmber 1995, the WEU
mlnrstcrs "agreed that thc possibilitv cxrsts for
the partrcrpation of WEU observers in the nerv
tasks defincd at Petersbcrg and that thrs rs an
rmportant contnbutron to the operatronal devel-
opmcnt of WEU Minrsters tasked the Perma-
nent Councrl to consider hou'best WEU observor
countnes could have the optron of participating
in such operations on a case-bv-casc basis".
65 In therr Brrmingham Declaratron of 7 Mav
1996. the WEU Council of Mrnrsters returned to
thrs sub.lect
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"Rccognrsmg the tradrtronallv actlve role
play'ed by the observer countnes rn the
field of [N peacekecprng and the contn-
butron that the observers could bnng to
WEU operatrons in the Petcrsberg frame-
u'ork. Minrstcrs recalled the tcrms of the
Madrid mandatc and u'elcomed the deci-
srons adoptcd b1' the Permanent Council
enabling thc observers to partrcrpate more
fullv rn Petcrsberg tasks and clarrfoing the
practlce and procedures applyng to ob-
sen'crs
66. The Councrl rnformed the Assembly of this
in the first part ofrts 42nd annual rcportlr.
"In Madrid. Mmisters had tasked thc Per-
mancnt Councrl to consider hou'WEU ob-
scn'cr countries could bcst partrcipate, on
a case-bv-case basis, rn the nerv tasks dc-
fined at Petersbcrg On 6 May,. the Pcr-
manent Councrl agreed on modalrtrcs
rvhich would allos' for obsen'er partrcrpa-
tron rn Petersberg tasks on a case-b1'-case
basrs On 2l Ma1,. it further agrccd to re-
quest the Plannrng Cell to take fonvard
u'ork on the rdcntrficatron of forccs from
obscrver countrles surtable for Petersberg
missrons A lornt Su'edish/Frnnrsh memo-
randum on partrcipation of WEU observ-
ers in WEU operations upon request by
the EU. u'as prcsented and drscussed at thc
Brrmrngham Mrnistenal Councrl "
No detarls rvcrc made avarlablc to the Asscmblr'
about thc content of thc Permanent Councrl's
decrsrons or the outcome of drscussions on the
so-callcd Sri'edrsh/Finnish rnitiatrve
67. At thc WEU Councrl of Mrnrsters mcetmg
in Ostcnd on 19 Nor,'embcr 1996. the mrnisters
u'elcomed
"the Presidencl,"s rnitiative on thc qucstron
of the partrcrpatlon of the Europcan alhes
m WEU opcratrons using NATO assets
and capabilrtrcs. as u'ell as in the plannrng
and preparatron of such operatrons. and
urged the Pcrmanent Council to find a sol-
ution bv December on this basrs."
68. Horr-ever. rt rs not onlv the WEU observer
countries but the associate mcmber and associate
partner countnes as \\'ell that are concerned b),
particrpation m Petersberg tasks. In this partrcu-
lar conncction it is u'orth notmg that the possr-
bilitv of Turke.v being rnvolved rn the dccrsron-
makrng process lvas mrtrally rejected b1' Grcece
But rn Apnl 1997 the Frcnch Presrdency'of WEU
succeeded rn secunng thc agreement of all WEU
mcmber countncs on a compromtse proposal it
had put fonvard cnabhng states such as Den-
mark, Iccland, Nom'av and Turkey'to partrcrpate
fullv rn WEU's dccrsron-makrng and planmng
process for operatrons using NATO assets.
Horvever, thrs arrangcment rrrll not applv to op-
crations planncd and rmplementcd b1'WEU act-
tng in an autonomous capacrtv Furthcrmore. rt
is still not clcar horv Austria, Frnland, Ireland
and Su'eden and the associatc partner countrrcs
are to be trcated in this conncctron.
69. It u'ould appear that a solutron acceptablc
to the fivc observer countncs enabhng them to
partrcrpate m such missrons has strll not bcen
found rn WEU. Attempts are now being made to
soh'e thc problem in thc intergovernmental con-
ference through a proposal to mclude Petcrsbcrg
tasks rn the Treatv on European Union The
Irrsh Presrdenc\"s draft rel'rsron proposes an
amended form of u'ording for Artrcle J 4 2 under
u'hrch WEU observer countries contrrbutmg to
those tasks urll bc allou'ed to particrpatc fu1l1,
and equallr' rn plannrng and decrsion-taking rn
WEU "in so far as these relatc to the commit-
mcnt and deplovment of [eachl member state's
national contributron". In contrast. the Nether-
lands Presrdcncy and the proponents of thc
phased rntcgratron plan lvant this restnctron
droppcd altogether
70. Thc countries that submrttcd thc phascd
integration plan thereforc propose the follou'rng
tcxt for Article J.4.3:
"When the Unron has recoursc to the
WEU to elaboratc and implcmcnt deci-
srons of thc Union on the tasks rcfcrrcd to
rn paragraph l. the Council shall. rn
agreement rvrth the instrtutions of the
WEU. take particular care to cnsure that
all Member Statcs of thc Union may par-
ticipate fulh' rn the WEU rn the elabora-
tion and rmplementation of thc decrsions
and actions of the Unron rcferrcd to rn 1."
71 This concept, u,hrch has Gcrman\-'s sup-
port in particular and rvhich u'as the oblectrvc of
11 Assembh'document 1549 of l8 November 1996
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a Srvedrsh/Frnnrsh rnrtrative, seems to stand a
good chance of bcrng rncorporated rn the Treatv
cr,'en though drffercnces of opmron strll exrst
among the obscrvcr countrres ol'er the exact
naturc of the tasks rn questron in u'hrch thcl' xrsh
to partrcrpate
72 A number of consrderations havc to be
taken mto account u,hcn assessrng thrs rnrtratrvc
Therc rs no doubt that a srtuatron rn u'hrch the
statcs conccrned have the possrbrlrtv of contnbut-
ing combat forces for a WEU peace mission but
cannot partlcrpate in the corrcspondrng plannrng
and decrsron-makmg proccss rs unsatisfacton'
Thrs u'as the vicrv expressed for rnstance by' the
Austrian Forcrgn Mmrster. Wolfgang Schussel.
on 17 February' 1997 m an address to a gatherrng
rn Petersberg ncar Bonn x'hen he cntrcrsed the
fact that as thrngs stand- Nonvav and Turkel' 
-
as NATO membcrs 
- 
n'ould plav a full part rn
thc entrre decrsron-making process for a WEU
pcace mission even though hardlv anv of therr
olrn troops rvould bc rnvolved, uhercas countnes
such as Austna. Srveden and Finland u'ould be
very largell' excludcd from deploy'mcnt and
preparatron plans evcn rf thcy' had been partl' to
the dccrsron in the European Union to undcrtake
thc mrssion and rrrshed thcrr oun troops to be
part of it.
73 It should also be borne rn mrnd that all
WEU assocrate partner countncs urshmg to par-
trcrpate rn Pctcrsberg tasks are ln a simrlarlv un-
sattsfacton' srtuation. Hou'ever. rn contrast to
countries such as Austria. Frnland. Ireland and
Su'eden, almost all these assoclatc partners hopc
to become full members of NATO and WEU as
soon as possrble At the gathcrrng rn Petcrsberg.
the Austrran Forergn Mmrster acknou ledged thrs
and told his audrence that, grven the clrcum-
stanccs, manv Austnans \\'ere askrng u'hcther
Austna's status as a WEU observer could strll be
bcncficral to the countn'
14 One of the rssucs rnvolved is rvhether rt is
the task of the Europcan rnstitutrons to accom-
modatc the states conccrncd as far as rs possrble
and guarantee their rrghts of codecision urthout
therr havrng to change the pnncrples oftherr sgc-
uritv and defence pohcies- or rvhether the instr-
tuttons should do eventhrng rn their pou'er to
persuade those states that thel' must be preparcd
to takc on rcsponsibilities for all aspects of a
comrnon secunt)' and defence pohcr'.
75 It all depcnds on rvhat Europc u'ants to
achreve riith the mtergovemmental confcrence
Thcrc are qualrtatrve drffcrcnces betu'cen cnsis-
management issucs and pure dcfencc rssucs But
the drstrnctron rs reallv a theoretrcal onc bccausc
crrsrs srtuatrons that mav result in Pctcrsbcrg-
tlpc tasks or operatrons along the hnes of IFOR
or SFOR can at an1'trmc casrlv turn into defence
operations lf u'e rvant to cncourage the fir'c ob-
seryer countries to drop therr resrstance to a full
European commrtment to all aspects of sccuntv
and dcfr:ncc. thc plan to rncludc Pctersberg tasks
in the Trcatv on European Union rs hardlv thc
nght ua1 of gorng about it
76 But if rt rs pnmarilr' a questron of accom-
modating thosc countnes so as to arrrve at an
rnstitutional rapprochcment betrvccn the Euro-
pean Union and WEU. the arrangcmcnt currentlv
takrng shape in thc rntergovernmental conference
rs an attractlve one
77 There is hou'cver no doubt that rf this rs to
be thc chosen course of actron. a rvhole senes of
stumbhng-blocks and obstacles lie ahcad. The
decrsron-making process for Petersberg tasks urll
becomc cven more complcx because rn future it
rvrll rnvolve the three drffcrcnt organrsations urth
the compctence to take dccrsrons on thcm.
nameh'. thc European Unron. WEU and NATO
The five WEU obsen'er countnes u'ould havc
codecision nghts in thc arca covgred bl' Art-
rcle VIII 3 of the modified Brusscls Treatv urth-
out havrng subscnbcd the Treatv rtself Thrs
would not bc thc first trme a trcatv change has
been made surroptrtrouslr'. urthout parhamentarl'
ratificatron Thc process of coordrnation be-
tu-een NATO and WEU rs drfficult cnough as it
rs but rt rvould bccomc even more comphcated rf
a number of states that do not bclong to crther
organisatton had full votrng nghts m the planning
and dccision-making process for Pctcrsbcrg
tasks In that event thc rmplementation of the
CJTF concept uould also have to be revrscd m
part
78. All these drffrcultrcs har,'e prevcntcd a
satisfactorv solution berng found rn the drscus-
srons berng conducted rn WEU urth a vreu' to
rmpro!'rng arrangements for the participatron of
the obsen'er countnes m Petersberg tasks, rvrthin
the hmits of therr status. There rs no doubt that
these discusslons are difficult. Bccausc rt is not
rn possession of more detarled mformatron. the
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Assemblv rs unable to ludge u'hcthcr the abscncc
of a satrsfacton solutron might also be due to the
fact that thc EU caprtals have perhaps not been
cxcrclslng cnough polrtical pressurc rn the ncgo-
tratrons golng on m the Permancnt Councrl
79. Thc rdea of the European Union srmpl1'
drctatrng that WEU should changc the status rt
accords to the fir'c observer countries is not the
solutron either Yet the contcnt of thc amcnd-
ments bcmg proposed for Artrcle J 4 to enable
those countrics to partrcipate rn Petersberg tasks
amounts to nothrng less
80 Srnce WEU is an rntegral part of the dc-
vclopment of the Europcan Union, thcrc is no
point rn encumbenng thc Treatv on Europcan
Unron rvith dctarls of the WEU decrsion-making
process for Petersberg tasks It should m fact be
thc prerogatrve of WEU to negofiatc such mattcrs
bccause lavrng dou-n the relevant arrangemcnts
in the TEU u'ould merelv mean passrng the
problems onc organrsatron has been unable to
solve on to tu'o differcnt organisations. Thc IGC
particrpant states have )'et to dnulge u,hat thev
intend to tcll thc natronal parhaments and the
public at large b1' u'a1' of offcnng a plausrble
explanatron of the polrtical and practical advan-
tages to be garncd from these changes
8l While thc princrpal u'eakness of the
phascd rntegratron plan as a u'hole lics in rts al-
most cxclusrvelv mstitutronal approach. rt also
farls to set anv clear polrtrcal ob.;ectrvcs If thc
intcntron behrnd rt rs to dralv closer rn practrcal
tcrms to the ob3cctrvc of establishrng a common
sccurrty' and defence rdcntrtr'. thcn thrs rs all to
the good. But in ordcr to achreve that objectn'e.
account must be taken rn thc first instance of the
varying intcrcsts rnvoh'ed and consideration must
be given to the mattcr of hou' all the European
members of NATO and the Europcan Unron can.
m so far as is possrble. partrcrpate u,ithout re-
stnction rn all aspccts of a securltv and defence
s1'stem. From thrs pornt of vrov rt rs encouragmg
that rn Artrcle 2 of the phased integratron plan rts
authors propose that during the first phase a
r,r'hitc paper should bc draun up, u'rthrn the
frameuork of thc CFSP. ln cooperatron urth
WEU and bascd on the u'ork alreadv carried out
bf it. outlining a common defence pohcy concept
rn pursurt of common secunt), mterests
82 For as long as there remarn some EU
member states that cannot or do not want to par-
ticrpate rn all aspects of a common defence. the
European Unron cannot takc thc placc of WELf .
It rs for thrs reason that rn futurc the European
Unron should onlv admrt nerv members prcpared
to become full members of WEU and ablc to
fu lfil the nccessan' condrtions
J. The option of closer cooperation
on the busis of u flexibility clause
83. Thc Ncthcrlands Presrdcno' dcscnbed thrs
problcmatrc issue rn thc follourng terms
"As the Dublin II Outhne strcsscd, thc
rssue of uhat has come to be called
"flexibi1itr"' or "closer cooperatron" 
- 
that
rs the possrbrlrtv for a hmrtcd number of
member statcs to coopcrate morc closelv rn
specrfic areas usmg the rnstitutronal
framqrork of thc Uruon 
- 
is one of the
most important rssues bcing cxamrncd b1'
the Confercncc. The Confcrcnce outcome
in thrs regard urll be signrficant for thc
future development of thc Union."
(a) The Franco-German proposal of
l7 October 1996
84. The Franco-Gcrman consideratrons play
an important role hcrc bv proposrng the inclusron
rn the Treatl' of a general clause or several
clauses on closer cooperahon, therebl' makrng rt
possrble for those member statcs that so rvish to
move ahead s'rth the process of European inte-
gratron faster than the others Thrs should enable
thc states conccrned to cooperate more closell'
u'hrlc rcmamrng urthm thc srngle rnstitutronal
framcu'ork of thc Europcan Unron Thcse mat-
tcrs are bemg drscusscd rn the intcrgol'crnmcntal
conference m the context of "flexibilrty,".
85. These consideratrons, u'hose fundamental
srgnificancc for the futurc development of the
Union \\'as grvcn special emphasis b1, the Irish
Prcsidencl,. could also lead to practrcal progrcss
in the development of a common secuntv and
defence pohcl', x'rthout threatcning thc overall
cohesron of the European construction process.
In thrs connectron rt should be remembered that
the Maastricht Trcatl' currentlv rn force alreadv
contarns flexibrlitv clauses rn paragraphs 4 and 5
of Artrclc J..1.
"4. Thc policl'of thc Union in accordance
iiith this Article shall not preludice thc
specrfic character of the securitv and de-
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fence pohcv of certam Member States and
shall respcct thc obhgations of certarn
Member States under the North Atlantrc
Treatl' and be compatrble rrrth the com-
mon secunty, and dcfonce pohcl' estab-
hshed urthin that framervork
5 The provisrons of thrs Artrcle shall
not prevent the developmcnt of closer co-
operation bct*'een trvo or more Member
Statcs on a brlateral level. rn the frame-
u'ork of the WEU and thc Atlantrc Alli-
ance, provrdcd such cooperatron does not
run counter to or rmpede that provrded for
in thrs Trtle "
86 On 17 October 1996, thc French and
German Forergn Ministers submrtted a jornt
contributron to discussion of the rssue of flexrbrl-
itv rn the IGC. Among other thrngs. rt includcs a
proposal for a closer cooperatlon clause specific
to the CFSP contarning thc follou'rng elements
Areqs ofapphcanon
(a) Closer cooperatron could appll' rn
areas covcrcd bv the CFSP. and
particularlv rn the framrng of a common
dcfence pohcv as provrded for rn Artrcle
J 4 of the TEU and the comrnon defence
also cnvisaged rn that Artrclc. in hnc urth
our corrrrnon oblectrves for the WEU and
urth coopcration on armaments It is
precrselv on account of their future
prospccts that these areas lend themselves
to closcr cooperatlon u'hrch u'ill rntcnsrfl,
the constructron of Europe
(b) Closcr cooperation could also takc
other forms. of uhrch detarls urll be givcn
later
The possibrlitl, of closer cooperatron
in accordance rvith Artrcle J 4 5 of the
TEU rs unaffected
2. Rrght of mttiatrve regardrng closer
cooperatton
Closer cooperatron u'ould be initiated
in accordancc with Article J.8 3 of the
TEU12.
12 Thrs Artrcle reads "Any Member State or the
Commrssron ma1, refer to the Councrl any question
relating to the common foreign and sccuritl' policl,
and mal' submrt proposals to the Councrl "
3 Pracltcaltmplementation
A minimum number of Member
States xould have to bc set for thc rmple-
mcntatlon of closer coopcration
1 Decrsron-mahng
The dccrsron-makrng procedurcs ap-
phcable to thc CFSP u'ould applv to closer
cooperation. Approval u'ould be bv
quahficd ma.lorrtr'"
87 Follourng the French and German Forcrgn
Mmrsters' confirmatron of their rnrtiativc at a
joint press conferencc rn Januan' 1997, the drs-
cussion in thc IGC has bccome more rntensrve
Its outcome rs hkelv to bc of particular srgnrfi-
cance for WEU
88 One of the manv contentrous pomts to bc
clarrfied rs thc cxtremelv rmportant question of
rvhether closer cooperation among a gl\,'en group
of states rn a specrfic area should takc place
solelv u'rthrn the mstrtutional framervork of the
European Unron or rvhether it could also take
place outsrde rt Whcrcas a maloritv of countrres
led by' France and Germanl firml;" support the
first optron. others such as thc Unrted Krngdom
and Denmark believe rt can also take place out-
srde the EU. for rnstance rn the framervork of
WEU or among the srgnatories of the Schcngen
Agreementl 3
89. There are also differences of oplnlon over
n'hcther the flcxrbrlrt)' optlon should be uscd as
often as possrblc (Francc and Germanl,'s posi-
tron) or u'hether it should be the erccption to thc
rulc One group of statcs. ri'hrch rncludes the
Benelux countncs. has pornted out that it must
not be allorved to lcopardise the ol'erall cohesion
of the European Uruon
(b) The ltalian proposal of 11 January 1997
90 According to Ital1,'s proposal. thc aim of
the rulcs on closcr cooperatron, especrallv u'rth
enlargement in mrnd. rs to enable mtegratlon to
develop rn accordance rvrth thc oblectrvcs and
rules of thc Treatl' lvhere crrcumstances do not
permrt all member states to procced m stcp A
basrc premrsc underlvrng the proposal rs that
enhanced cooperatron should not impair thc
Unron's common policies or therr dcl'elopmcnt,
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or result rn EU member statcs rvhich do not loin
in from the outset berng srdehned Closcr or cn-
hanced cooperation should be the exceptton and
not the rule. It should not be used b1, a mlnont\'
to forge ahead u'hilc thc rcst look on. rather, it
should be the means for avoiding a mmorttv
stopplng drfferentratcd rrutiattves from procced-
ing rn a rcstricted frameu'ork urth thc agreement
of thc majority.
9l The Italians consider, horvever, that en-
hanced cooperation in the fields of sccurity and
defence seems to be lustified grven the objective
drfferences in mcmber states' sttuattons in thrs
respect. It u'ould therefore be concetvable that
strengthenrng the securitl' of thc Unron and its
member statcs, an objectrve of the common for-
ergn and secuntv pohcy' undcr Article I | 2,
could be pursued to varying degrees. Thcy also
note that membership of WEU u'hrch. under the
terms of Artrcle J 4 2, -'is an mtegral part of the
development of the Union", rs a distincttve fea-
ture, on u'hrch some member states rvould be
able legitimately'to build cnhanced securttl, and
defcncc cooperatlon tn the Uruon framer,r'ork.
92. The Italian Government therefore pro-
posed the additron of a neu' Article C(a) n the
Treaty on Europcan Union
''Where onc of the objectrves of the Union
cannot bc pursued through measures
apphcablc to all Member States, no provr-
sron of thrs Treaty' or of the Treaties es-
tabhshrng the European Communitl' shall
prevent that objectrve bcing pursued b1,' a
limrtcd numbcr of Member States urthrn
the srngle institutional framework of the
Union.''
93. Furthermore, Italv considers that Articlc
J.4 of the Treaty' on European Union should be
supplemented by a neu' artrcle J.4(a) readng
"l The provisions of Artrcle J 4 shall not
prevent mcmbcr states being authorised to
develop, through the mstrtutions. proce-
dures and mechanisms of this Treaty,
closer collaboration m the area of secuntl'
and defencc 
- 
includrng coopcration on
armaments 
- 
based on thcrr common
membcrshrp of the WEU Such collab-
oratron must compll'u-ith the oblcctives of
this Titlc, the gurdehnes lard doun by the
Council of Europe and the decisions
alreadl adopted rn the framervork of tho
cornmon forergn and socuntv pohcl'.
Thc authorisation provrded for m thts
paragraph shall bc granted by'the Councrl,
actrng b1' a quahfied majontl, at the re-
quest of the mcmber states concerned,
u'hrch must tn anv evcnt mclude the mem-
ber states of the Union u'hrch are also
members of thc WEU
2. The mcasures adopted by the Councrl
in the contcxt of the coopcratlon referred
to m thrs Artrcle shall apply' onl.v to the
particrpatrng states Thcl'shall be adopted
in accordancc uith the procedures lard
doun rn thrs Trtle for the areas the1, refer
to. uith the follou'ing erccptions:
(a) thc Councrl's quahfied majority shall
consrst of the votes of trvo-thirds of tho
participating statcs. calculated in accor-
dancc rvrth Artrcle 148 (2) of the TEC.
(h) unanimitv shall comprise onll' the
partlclpatlng states
3. Expendrturc for the measures adopted
by' the Councrl under thrs Artrcle, except
for the administrative costs, shall be borne
b1' the partrcipatmg states.
4 The non-participatmg statcs shall re-
frain from an1' action uhrch runs counter
to, or u'hrch might adverscll' affect. the
measurcs adopted b1' thc Council under
this Artrcle.
5 Anv non-partrcrpating state mav. at
any' trme, declare that rt rvishes to jorn in
thc mrtratrves takcn pursuant to thrs Art-
rclc: rt shall undertake to assume all thc
obligations rvhich result from the measures
alrcadl' adoptcd for their implcmentation
The Councrl u'rll act by' a quahficd major-
it1'on such a request,''
94. Fundamental drfferences of oprruon con-
trnue to exist over u'hether the decrston on closer
cooperation should be taken unanimousll' (the
Brrtrsh vieu'). b1' a qualified majoritv (the posi-
tion of Francc. Gcrmanv and a number of other
states) or onl1' bv those states uishtng to take
part in such cooperation
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(c) The proposals submitted by the Netherlands
Presidency ofthe European (Jnion
on 20 March 1997
95. On the basis of drscussrons rn the inter-
gol'ernmental confcrcnce. the Nctherlands Prcsi-
dcncv proposed that thc option of closcr coop-
cratlon betu'een member states preparcd to move
ahead rn that drrectron should be addressed bv
mcorporatrng a general clause and a number of
specrfic clauses in the Treatl' The gencral
clause u'ould read as follou's
"Arttcle ( I )
I Member States u'hrch rntend to est-
ablish closcr coopcration betu'een them
mav make use of thc rnstrtutrons, proce-
dures and mechanisms lard doun b1, thc
Trcatrcs provrded that the coopcration:
(") rs armcd at enhancrng European rnte-
gratron and at protcctmg and scn,mg the
rnterests of thc Unron.
(b) respects the princrples of thc Trcatres
and rs consrstent urth therr objectrvcs.
@ is onlv uscd as a last rcsort. rvhere
ob.;cctrves could not be attarned bv appll'-
rng the relevant procedures laid doun rn
thc Trcaties:
(d) conccms at lcast a maJorltv of
Mcmbcr States,
@ safeguards thc srngle institutronal
framovork of the Unron.
(fl rcspects the "acquts communautatre"
and all thc measures adoptcd under the
other provrsrons of the Trcaties.
@ does not prejudrce thc rntercsts of
those Membcr States uhich do not partici-
pate thercin;
(h) allou's thcm to become partres to thc
cooperatlon at anv time, provided that thev
comply' urth thc dccisions already' taken
u'rthrn this framcuork.
(t) comphes ri'ith the specrfic additronal
crrtcna laid doun rn Artrcle 5(a) of the
TEC and Artrcles J 12 and K 7 of thrs
Treatl' respectrvelr', dcpcndrng on the area
conccrned and rs authonscd b.v the Councrl
in accordance u'ith the procedures lard
dorvn thcrem
2 Member States shall applr,, to the
extent that thel,arc concerned. the acts and
decisions adopted for the rmplcmentation
of the cooperatlon rn u'hrch thcv partrci-
pate Member States not partrcrpatrng m
such cooperatron shall not rmpedc the im-
plcmentatron thercof by the partrcrpatmg
Member States
Arficle (2)
I For the purposes of the adoptron of
the acts and decrsrons ncccssary for the
rmplcmcntatron of the cooperation referred
to rn Article (l), thc relevant instrtutional
provisrons of the Treatres shall appll'
Horlever, uhile all mcmbers of the
Councrl shall be able to take part in the
dehberatrons. onh' those rcprcsenting par-
trcrpating Mcmbcr States shall take part rn
the adoption of decisions, thc quahfied
ma3orrtv shall bc defined as tu'o-thrrds of
the votes of thc Council membcrs con-
cerned u'erghted rn accordance urth Article
148(2) of the TEC; unanimity shall be
constituted b1' only' thosc Council mcmbers
conccmed.
2 Expenditure rcsultrng from rmplemen-
tatron of the cooperatron, other than ad-
mrnrstratrve costs cntatled for the institu-
trons. shall be borne by the particrpatrng
Member States."
96. In thc opmion of the Netherlands Presr-
dency there arc a number of possrbrlitres for
dcaling x-ith the rssue of closer cooperatron in the
field of the CFSP such as (a) constructrve ab-
stention, rvhrch has already'bccn drscussed. (b)
dctarhng from the outset the specific areas in
rvhrch flexibilitv should be an optron. for cxam-
ple rn relatron to the mutual assistance obhgatron
or cooperatlon on armaments. or (c/ confcrnng
specrfic tasks on onc or more membcr states
rrrthrn thc frameu'ork of a loint action The
Netherlands Presidencv also rvonders u'hcther.
grven that provisions on closer cooperatron rn
defence alreadv exist rn thc Treatr' (Artrclc
J.6 5), there is an)' requrrcment for further
clauses on flexrbrlrty'rn the CFSP
97 Wrth thrs reservatlon. the Netherlands
Presidency' proposcs the follou'rng text for Art-
icle J.l2 on closcr cooperation rn the CFSP:
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" l . Mcmber States u'hrch intend to
cstablish closer cooperatton betu'een thcm-
selves may be authonsed, subject to Art-
rcles (l) and (2), to make use of the rnsti-
tutions. proccdurcs and mechanisms lard
donn by'the Treatres provrded that the co-
operation proposed
(a) respects the pou'ers of the European
Communrtres, as lvell as the oblectives set
for the CFSP by this Trtlc and the gurde-
lines and strategies defined by the Euro-
pean Council,
(b) arms to promote the rdentity' of the
Uruon and does not impalr tts effectiveness
as a cohesrve force in tntcmattonal rela-
trons
2. The authonsatton referred to m para-
graph I shall be the sublect of a unani-
mous Counctl dectston taken at the rcquest
of the Member Statcs concerned and after
invitrng the Commrssion to present re-
marks as appropriate The Council mav
accompanv thrs authonsation rvrth specific
condrtions
3. Admrssron of non-partrcipating
Member Statcs (p.m.).
4. The provrsrons of Articles J to J.11
shall applv to the closer cooperation pro-
vrded for rn ths Artrcle. savc as othenvise
provrdcd m thrs Article or rn Articles (l)
and (2).''
98. In contrast to thc Franco-German and
Itahan proposals, the Netherlands draft revision
suggcsts that authorrsation for closer cooperation
should be the sub.lect of a unantmous decisron
99. Given that WEU rs an mtegral part of the
development of the European Uruon, it should
use thc opportunity of the current debatc to put
fonrard proposals on the issue of flexrbilitl-.
WEU 
- 
in u'hich 28 countnes are mvolvcd in one
\\'av or another 
- 
is alrcadl' a practical cxample
of flcxible cooperatron It should rnsrst that the
European Union should grve more support than it
has done in the past to the idea that closer co-
operation among the l0 member states that have
srgned the modrfied Brussels Treatv can be fur-
ther enhanced w'ithrn WEU
100. In thrs rcspect too, evcnthing depends on
the goals to bc pursued bf introducrng flexibilrtl'
clauses that u'ould apply in thc field of securttl'
and defence. Such a move could have a postttvc
effect if rt.
serves the purposc of drarving closer to
a genuine common European defence tn
rvhrch all the European membcrs of
NATO and, at a later stage. thc WEU
assoctate partncrs could partrcrpate,
and
makes it easicr for all the EU member
states that have hitherto not been m-
volved rn the core of the European de-
fence svstem to becomc part of lt.
101. With a viov to achtevtng thc first of thesc
objectives and as an important mcans of enhanc-
rng cooperatron still further through the revised
TEU, evcn more emphasis than at present should
be placed on the provtsions estabhshed in Artrclc
J.4.5 of thc existrng TEU for closer cooperation
m the framcrvork of WEU. rncludrng the possr-
bilrty'of WEU member countncs taking thctr oun
decisrons. m pursuance of thc provlslons of the
modrfied Brussels Treatl'. In this respect the
Itahan proposal for a flexibrlity clause ts on the
nght course. Thc sccond oblectrve could be
promoted through a revtscd WEU cnlargement
pohcl,geared to cncouraging all the EU member
statcs to accedc to thc modified Brussels Trcah'.
5, Democratic control in security
and defence matters
102. The intcrgovernmental conference is also
tackling the problcm of bettcr dcmocrattc control
of the EU's executive body and. in addrtron to
examining the rssue of incrcascd powers for the
European Parliament, ls dtscussmg hou' thc
national parliaments can be more closcly
involved in the EU decision-makmg process
103 The Insh Presidcncy' proposed that the role
of the natronal parltamcnts rn thc European
Uruon be spelt out rn a ne\v protocol to be
anncxed to the revtscd Treatl' on European
Unron Among other thrngs, the protocol rvould
formally recognise the activities of thc Confer-
cnce of European Affairs Committees (COSAC),
u'hose remrt is to examine Europcan Uruon
issues, and gn'e rt the possibilrtl' of having a say
in the EU's legrslatrve proccdurc subject to
certain condittons. Accordrng to the draft
proposals crrculatcd, this rvould not extend to the
area of apphcation of Title V (the CFSP).
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104 There should of course be no attempt to
cxtend the Confcrence's area of competence to
thrs field given that rt falls rvrthm thc area of re-
sponsrbilitv of thc WEU Assemblv Hou'ever, it
should be bome m mrnd that at thc cnd of 1995,
the Parhamentan' Rcflectron Group studl.ing
rssucs for drscussron at the intergovernmental
confcrencc looked rnto the questlon of hou'
democratrc control at thc European ler,,el mrght
also be rmproved for the CFSP in the futurc In
thrs conncctron. it rs u'orth rccalhng paragraph
l1 of Recommendation 606 of 2 December 1996
rn u'hrch the Assembly recommended that thc
Councrl.
"Ask that the bodr- of the Treatv u'hrch is
to be draftcd bv the IGC rnclude the prin-
crple to rihtch the Parhamcntary Reflec-
tron Group on the 1996 rntcrgovernmental
conferencc referred to tn Athens on
4 Decembcr 1995, accordrng to u'hrch the
WEU Asscmblv u'ould be rnvrtcd to con-
tnbute to thc u'ork of the Confercncc of
European Affarrs Committecs u'hen mat-
ters concernrng European secuntv rvere
under drscussron "
It rull indccd be necessan, rn the future to pa1'
evcr closcr attention to the problem of grcater
collectrve rnvolvement of thc natronal parhaments
m the control of European securrty and defcncc
pohcv as lt movcs rnto the spherc of competcncc
of the Europcan Union.
105 Hou,cvcr, the phased plan for the tntcgra-
tion of WEU in the Europcan Union. submitted
b1' Belgium. France. Germanr'. Italy', Luxem-
bourg and Sparn. glves no rndicatron u,hatsoever
of the problems thcrr proposals rarsc for parha-
mentarv bodres urth a controlhng functron The
onlv verled referencc to thrs appears rn Artrcle 3
u'hrch states that dunng the second phasc "links
shall bc estabhshed bctu'een the relevant institu-
trons of the EU and WEU m order to make pos-
srblc the transfer of competences envisaged for
Phase 3".
106. According to Artrcle 4 of the phased rnte-
gration plan, the mtegratlon process u,ill bc
completed during the thrrd phase by "transfernng
the competcnces of the instrtutions and bodies of
the WEU to the relevant mstitutions of the EU
and rncorporating other remarnlng WEU struc-
tures rnto the EU" It is not clear uhich WEU
structures rvould fall rnto rvhrch of these trvo
categones The WEU Assembly, should make rt
absolutel,v clear at thrs stage that for as long as
decrsrons on defencc matters conttnue to be taken
by consensus on an mtergovernmental basrs.
democratic parhamentan'control over a common
Europcan defence must not be handed ovcr to the
Europcan Parhament but to a parliamcntan' bodv
composed of parliamcntarians from the member
statcs, as rs the present casc in thc Assembll, of
WEU Furthcr developmcnts m European rnte-
gratron in thc field of sccuntv and defence lull
determrne u'hat cntena should be used for re-
vreu'ing the composrtron of such a body in order
to improve rts democratic lcgrtrmacr,, the repre-
sentatrve lverght lt carnes and rts po\\'crs of con-
trol.
III. The eloborution of proposals
from the LYEU Assembly for the revision of
Title V of the Treaty on European Union
107 In its comments on rts draft Treatv revi-
sron proposals of 5 December 1996. thc lrrsh
Presrdencl' sard that future relations betu'ecn
WEU and the European Union were one of the
most sensrtrvc lssues undcr consrderatron at thc
mtergovcrnmental conference
108. At the European Forum gathering on
l7 Februarl' 1997 m Bonn. Wcrner Ho1'er, Mm-
rster of State at the German Mrnrstry of Foreign
Affairs, sard that Europcans urgentlv needed to
shorv a greatcr community sprrit The rntergov-
ernmental confcrcnce could. and had to, do no
more and no lcss than estabhsh the contractual
basrs for the revrscd Treatl' and rts institutional
framervork. Polrtrcal u'rll u'as ncccssarv to burld
on rt and make good use of rt. Thcsc comments
point to the basrc drlemma facing the states par-
trcrpating in the mtergovernmental conference.
Vrervs drffer as to hou'to generate the necessary
communitv sprrit Some people, such as
Mr Schussel. the Austrian Foreign Mmister. as
he shox'ed u'hen addressrng the European Forum,
are convinced that joint operational decrsron-
making structures and proccdures can make a
ven' valuable contnbutton to the shaping of
corrrmon interests. But rt rs not enough for the
necessar)' polrtrcal u'ill to manifest itself merell,
for the purpose of rmplementing treaties that
have alreadl' bccn concluded. Common politrcal
urll is esscntral durrng the treatl' negotiailons
thcmselves and u,ithout rt. the mcmber states rvill
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be unable to agree on the mstrtutional frameu'ork
that rs needed Thrs oblectlve can onh' be
achreved through polrtrcal persuasion
109 The drlemma residcs among other things in
the fact that there rs strll no agreement on rvhat
the objcctn'es should bc In WEU and tts
Assembly. there needs to be a broad measure of
agrcement that the prrme ob.lectrve should be to
make real progress on thc claboration of a com-
mon European sccuritl' and defence pohcl'. In
contrast. rt u'ould appear that thc main shortcom-
rng rn the oplnron of the rnstitutrons of the Euro-
pean Uruon and the malorrtl' of rts member states
hes m thc fact that until nou,the Union has had
no proper secuntv and defence drmensron and
that the EU and NATO havc no drrect relations
I10. The European Union consistentlv grves the
impressron that it accords a hrgher pnorrtv to
thesc mstrtutronal problems than to the actual
rssucs themselves. This accounts for the ambrva-
lent attrtudc of many of rts represcntatives to-
rvards WEU Thcrc rs a contradrction in con-
stantll,marntammg that WEU, and especrally' rts
opcrational capabrlitl,, must be strengthened
u'hrlc at thc same trme stressing that "WEU can-
not be alloued to continuc to exrst rndcfinrtcll' as
an rndepcndent organrsatron outsrdc the European
Unron"ru. Of course WEU is not an end rn itself
and it has never considered rtself as such. But
thrs is also truc of othcr lnternatlonal organisa-
trons Since thc European Unron has admrtted a
number of member states that either do not rvant
defence to be part of the Unron or do not u'ish to
belong to a proper dcfence alhance, it can neither
take over thc u'ork of WEU nor make the Or-
ganrsation an rntegral part of rts rnstitutronal
framcuork, This srtuation u,rll persist for some
trmc to comc u'hethcr one hkes it or not
I I I In thc meantrme, to prevent the efforts be-
ing made to improve the European secuntl, and
dcfcnce drmensron reachmg a standstill. there is
no alternatrve othcr than to further strengthen
WEU, but thrs task must not be undertaken half-
heartedly' In drarving up its proposals. the
Assembh' should be gurded b1' these consid-
erations. If the Europcan Unron is mtcnt upon
paving the x'a1' for a proper Europcan secunt)'
and defence unron, rt must do everything it can to
ensurc that all thc European member countries of
NATO, and rn partrcular Denmark, Iceland.
Nonval'and Turkev, can plal'a full part in rt and
that countries u'rth a neutral tradttton, such as
Austrra, Frnland, Ireland and Su'cden, do not
stand aloof from it. Article O of the Treatl, on
European Unron. x'hrch sets forth the condrtrons
for accession, should make clear among other
thrngs that only' those apphcant countries
prepared to partrcrpate ln a colrlmon defence
rvrthout rcservatron can be admrtted as EU
mcmbers
l12. The logical conclusron rn this process
uould be for the Treatl' on European Union to
mcorporate not onlv Artrcle V of thc modificd
Brusscls Treatl' but also its preamble rvhich ex-
presses the WEU member states' rcsolvc, ln
accordance rvith the Charter of the Unitcd
Nations, to afford assrstance to each other in
maintarning rnternational peace and security and
rn resisting an1' pohcy' of aggrcssion
113. It is clear that the present situation does
not meet thc conditions that rvould be necessary
before all thc EU member states u'ere in a posi-
tion to subscnbe a preamblc of this tlpe This is
not due so much to the fact that the European
Unron, WEU and NATO are madc up of drffer-
ent members as to the inexistence of the loint
polrtrcal rirll that is needcd if thc European Union
is to become a military po\\-er tn the rcal sense.
No research or studies have yet been carrted out
to explore in depth erther the advantages and drs-
advantages of such a transformatron or u'hat its
consequcnces u'ould be. Until this fundamental
questron has been full1' clanfied. the step-by-stcp
rnstitutional rapprochcment betrveen WEU and
the European Union can onlv go forward vcry
gradually.
114. In the meantrme the European Uruon
should stop trying to poach specific areas of re-
sponsibilrtl'from WEU as this defies the logrc of
Europe's security and defence pohcl'. In addition
to the fact that such attempts weakcn the politrcal
and milrtarl'role of WEU u'hrch, by virtue of the
decrsions taken bv NATO m Bcrlin, rvas only
recently glven a nerv dimension, there ts nothmg
to suggcst that transferrrng spccific areas of the
securitl, and defence pohcy to the European
Union u'ould make rt an1'easier for Europeans to
takc more actlon rn this area.t'Werner Hoycr on 17 Fcbruary 1997 rn Bonn.
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ll5 In fact rt rs onlv to bc expected that the
lack of homogenertv among the EU member
states u,ould make it even more drfficult for
agreemcnt on decrsrons rvith mrlrtary or defcncc
rmphcatrons to be reached in thc European Uruon
than rn WEU
116. Thc revrscd versron of Trtle V of the
Treatl,on Europcan Unron should therefore makc
Article J 4 2 as amcnded by' thc Insh Prcsidency'
thc lertmotif for rclations betu'ccn the Union and
WEU It states that thc Unron u.rll avarl rtself of
WEU to claborate and rmplcment decrsrons and
actrons of the Unron rvhrch have defence rmpli-
cations.
ll7. This w'ould mean that untrl such trmc as
thc European Unron. WEU and the European
part of NATO are composcd of the same mem-
bers and untrl all the membcr states agree on the
purpose of transformrng the European Union rnto
a European sccuritv and dcfence communrt)',
WEU i.irll rn general act on behalf of the Euro-
pean Unron m all securrtv and defencc mattcrs
On the basis of this arrangemcnt. the provrsrons
descnbcd belou could be proposed for incor-
poratron rn the rc'"'rsed Treatl'
I18. Artrcle J I should rncludc a reference to
the fact that the oblectrvc of strengthcnrng thc
sccurrtv of the Unron and rts membcr states tn thc
longer tcrm prcsupposcs the inclusion of a
mutual assrstance clause
ll9 Takrng the Irrsh Prcsrdencl"s proposal as
a basrs, Artrclc J 4 I should rcad.
''Thc common forcrgn and sccurity pohcy
shall rnclude all qucstrons relatmg to the
sccurltv of thc Uruon. includrng the pro-
gresslvc framrng of a common dcf0nce
policl' rn the pcrspective of a common de-
fencc "
and should be supplcmcnted b1'the follou'ing
"Full apphcatron of the modificd Brussels
Treaty by l0 of thc 1,5 European Unron
mcmber states that belong to WEU shall
constltute an rmportant mcans to that cnd."
120 Thcre arc no practrcal or polrtrcal advan-
tages to be garned bv transferrrng Pctcrsberg
tasks to and/or rncludrng armaments policv rn the
European Union's area of responsrbrlitt' Hox'-
ever. a spccrfic reference to these tasks could be
rncluded in the dcscriptron of thc relatronship
betx'ccn the Unron and WEU. Artrcle J 12
should accordrnglv bc amended to rcad
"The Wcstern Europcan Unron togethcr
urth all rts rnstrtutrons rs thereforc an rntc-
gral part of the developmcnt of the Euro-
pean Unron and the Unron shall accord-
rnglv fostcr closer rnstrtutronal and rvork-
ing rclatrons urth rt Thc Member States
of the EU and thc WEU havc madc rt therr
arm to enablc all WEU assoclate member.
assocrate partncr and observcr countrres to
partrcrpate progressrvely in all aspects of a
common European defence Thel' u'rll
rvork actrvelv rn the European Unron and
the WEU to achreve that arm uhich should
make progressrve mtcgratlon bctu'een the
WEU and the Unron possrble. Thrs can be
achieved in several phases u'hrch shall be
defined m greater dctarl rn a separatc
document, to be draftcd jorntll' b1' thc
WEU and the European Uruon "
Orung to the scnsrtlve nature of thcse problems.
rt rvould be adr,'rsable to abandon anv notron of
thc Treatl'having as an appendrx a protocol to be
drafted on this sublect srnce thrs might prevent
the mtergovernmcntal conferencc from being
concluded rn tlme for the summrt meetrng sched-
ulcd to takc place in Amstcrdam Hou'o'cr the
folloxing provlslon could be rncluded rn thc
Trcatr'.
"The compctcnt bodrcs of the WEU and
the European Union shall bcgin the rcle-
l'ant negotiatrons to thrs end upon slgna-
ture of the revised Trcatl' on Europcan
Unron Thev shall in partrcular estabhsh
both thc procedure to be follou'cd for the
phases lcadrng to integratron and a ttmc-
frame for achreving that aim. The Euro-
pcan Councrl shall take the neccssan' dc-
clslons on the basrs of rcports submitted
b1'the WEU and the European Unron "
l2l Artrclc J.4.3 should rcad
"Untrl the oblectrvcs lard doun m para-
graph 2 have been achievcd, the Union
confcrs upon the Western European Union
(WEU), in pursuance of thrs Treatr'. the
task of takrng decrsions u'ith defence rm-
plications on behalf of the Unron and of
elaboratrng and rmplomenting actions re-
sulting from them. In particular these
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shall include permanent obscrvation of
crisis srtuatrons. Petcrsberg tasks (hum-
anrtarran tasks, rescue tasks. peacekeeprng
tasks and tasks of combat forces in cnsrs
managcment. rncludrng peacemaking) and
the claboratron of a common armaments
pohcr'"
122 ArtrcleJ4 4 shouldread:
"Wherever the WEU acts rn pursuance of
Article J 4 3. it shall, rn agreement u'ith
the mstrtutrons of the European Union,
take care to ensurc that all WEU assocratc
member, associate partner and observcr
states participate fuIl1, urthin the limits of
therr status rn the WEU, rn the WEU
planning and decrsron-makrng procedurc.
The WEU Councrl shall takc action urthm
the meaning of the preceding paragraphs
in rcsponse to a request from an1' WEU
member, assocrate member, assocrate
partncr or observer state, or to an mrtratrve
of the WEU Secretan'-General."
123. Artrcle J.4 5 should read:
"The provrsions of this Treatl' concerning
constructive abstentron shall be apphed by'
analogv to decisrons taken b1, thc WEU
rvrthm the meanrng of thrs Artrcle. The
WEU u'rll vcnfu rvhethcr the provrsrons of
the modrfied Brussels Treaty nced to be
adapted as a result At the request of a
member state, the decisron of the WEU
Councrl shall be taken at head of statg or
government level."
The current Artrclc J.4 3 u'ould be dcleted,
Artrcles J 4 4 and J.4.5. rvould remaln unchanged
and would be renumbered J.4.6 and J.4.7. the
current Article J.4 6. uould be deleted
124. In conlunctron urth the competent instrtu-
trons of the European Unron, it rs suggested that
a document could be draun up on the progressivc
mtegratron of the WEU associate membcr, asso-
crate partner and observer states in a common
security and defence system under the auspices
of the European Union; this document should
compnse the follou'ing components :
(a) thc claboratron of a rvhrtc paper out-
hning a common defencc policv concept ln
pursurt of the common secuntl' rnterests of
all 28 WEU countries.
(b) a gradual upgradrng of the status of
the WEU associate member, assoclate
partner and observer countncs,
k) thc progressrvc parhcrpatlon of the
WEU assocrate members and associate
partncrs in thc u'ork of thc CFSP rn the
frameu'ork of the European Union,
(d) an assessment, ln agreement urth
NATO. of the rmphcations for rmplemen-
tatron of the CJTF concept of institutional
convergencc betrvcen WEU and the EU;
(e) the partrcrpatron of the WEU Sccrc-
tarv-General rn all meetmgs of the Councrl
of Mrnrsters of the Unron and of the Euro-
pcan Council at u'hich matters concernlng
the CFSP are discussed:
(/) clarificatron of the rssues concerning
the future form of parliamentarl' control
over European defcnce through a dcmo-
cratrc European supen'isor1' bodv com-
posed of natronal parhamcntarians, ln
u'hrch represcntatrvcs of thc Assembly of
WEU u'ould participate.
(g) a decrsron on the components of the
modified Brussels Treatl' u'hrch. rn addr-
tron to the mutual assrstance clause con-
tamed rn Artrcle V and thc clausc on coop-
eration lrrth NATO contamed rn Artrcle
IV, should be incorporated in the Treatv
on European Union:
(h) rdentrfication of those statcs that are
able and urlhng to accede to a Treatv on
European Union enhanced by the essentral
components of the modrfied Brussels
Treaty' and of those that the European
Uruon rs prepared to admrt
125 The current version of Artrcle J 4.5 of the
TEU has recentll' taken on increased srgnrfi-
cance. It rmphes that WEU must, on the basis of
thc modificd Brusscls Treatl', remaln rn a posi-
tlon to take rts oxn decisions on the implementa-
tron of Petersberg missions using militar)' means
and on other matters that fall rvrthin rts area of
competence. It rs encouragrng that the WEU
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Secretary'-General has pubhcly referred to this
requrrement on a number of recent occaslons't.
126. Unfortunately, however. it has been shown
m practrce that the governments of the WEU
member states are mcreasmglv lacking in the
politrcal u'ill needed to explort the possibilities
offered by'the modified Brussels Treatf in crisis
situatrons Indced, there appears to be a rvide-
spread fceling that, as France's Permanent Rep-
resentatrve to WEU recently' said, organrsatrons
such as WEU have no independent polrtrcal role
to pla1, and are merely a vehicle for rmplementrng
politrcal decisions taken elsewhere'u. Thrs attr-
tude u'as also apparent in r.vhat the French For-
ergn Ministcr, Herv6 de Charette, sard to mem-
bers of the Assembll''s Presidential Commrttee
on 14 Aprrl
127 . This may r,r'ell be one of the reasons rvhy'
no government of a WEU member state was pre-
pared, at least mrtrallv, to take an initiatrve, rn
pursuance of Article VIII3 of the modified Brus-
sels Treatr', to drarv up a plan withrn WEU for
setthng the Albanran cnsis. All that u'as done
rvas that on 14 March 1997, the Permanent
Council of WEU rssued a statement in rvhich.
among other things, rt expressed drsquret about
developments rn Albania and gave rts full support
to the actron being taken by the OSCE and the
European Union in thrs connectlon
128 It was not untrl 9 April that the Permanent
Councrl of WEU reached agreement on thc fol-
lou'ing procedure.
"The Councrl agreed to task the PMG to
examlne how WEU's experience in the
Mostar police operatron could be usefully'
applied to the rapid assembly of a multi-
national pohce advrsory element (urth an
initral strength of up to 20 offrcers) of the
Advisory Missron to Albanra, rvithout
pre.;udice to how such an element might be
organrsed, also taking into consrderation
the information gathered by the Plannrng
Cell during its particrpatron in the recent
Advance Team Mission to Albania. The
r5For example at the press conference he gave on 25
March 1997 and rn an address on 4 Aprrl 1997 to
the European People's Party group in the European
Parliament.
'u Deprt" lVews, T-13 Aprit 1997
Council rvill examme the report of the
PMG on l5 Aprrl 1997. also rn the hght of
developments in the EU and OSCE "
129 On 22 April the Permanent Council of
WEU at last decrded to send a fact-findrng group
to Albanraf to u'ork m cooperation lvrth the
Albanian authontres and the international protec-
tion force Accordrng to press reports, rts pnme
task rs to establish rvhat action the advisory' mrs-
sion planned by the WEU Council should take
Policc offrcers are to be part of that missron,
their 1ob berng to help the Albanians reburld and
train a policc force.
130. Grven that the Presrdent of Albania re-
quested WEU on 13 March to send in armed
forces to restore order m the country and that on
16 March the Speaker of the Albanian Parlia-
ment specrficalll' said rn a lettcr to thc President
of the Assembly that he rvould welcome inter-
vention by WEU in partrcular to help the Alba-
ruan authonties restore order and recover all the
weapons stolen from army' depots, it is incom-
prehensible that it \4'as not possrble for action of
thrs sort to be taken under WEU's control.
13 I . It rs all the more astonishrng m vierv of thc
fact that ltalr', France, Sparn and Greece as full
members of WEU, together with Turkey, an as-
sociate member, and a number of assocrate part-
ner and observer countncs such as Romania,
Bulgarra, Austria and Denmark u'erc prepared to
take part in a mrssron rn Albania under a man-
date from the United Nations. Furthermore. as
the French Presrdeno' of WEU pornted out, the
Satellrte Centre in Torrelon had done some excel-
lent rntelhgence rvork
132. Whrle the WEU Secretarl-General said
that WEU rvas ready to intervene but had not
been requested to do so b1,the European Union,
the French Forergn Mrnrster clearly stated that
WEU's operatronal capabrlitv u,as not 1,et ad-
vanced enough and. el'en more surprisingly, that
the current wordmg of the Treatl' on European
Union did not permit thc EU to give WEU a
mandate in cases such as that of Albania In re-
sponse to the commcnt that WEU could also act
rndcpendently by' vrrtue of the modrfied Brussels
Treaty, the Minister replied that France had in
fact proposed preparrng for action by,WEU but
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that a number of member states were opposed to
this.
133 Not havrng recourse to Article VIII 3 of
the modrfied Brussels Treaty in the Albanran
cnsls rs all the more regrettable given that its
apphcation in prevtous crisis situattons, such as
thc Gulf War and the conflict rn the Balkans,
proved that it was possible for the WEU member
states, or a group of them, to take lomt action on
the basrs of a treaty provision with a general
scope rvrthout it berng necessary to draw up spe-
crfi c arrangements for constructive abstention.
134. For as long as uncertaintv remains over
the application of Artrcle J.4.2 of the Treatl' on
European Unron. more frequent recourse must be
had in practice to the optlon of autonomous
actron by'WEU. This not only requrres political
wrll on the part of the member states but also
means that WEU must make clear to the United
Nations and the OSCE that they can grve WEU a
direct mandate to act in crists situattons.
135. Application of the modified Brussels
Treaty and the possrbrlity it provides for WEU to
take autonomous decistons is a specific example
of how the principle of flexrbrlity and closer co-
operation can be put rnto practtce rvrthout the
need for authonsation from the EU tnstituttons.
In such a case the question of whcther such
authonsatron should be given unarumously or by
a qualified ma.;ontv vote does not therefore arlse.
In situatrons with sensitrve polrtrcal implications,
it is always possible for the WEU Councrl to take
the necessary decisions at the level of heads of
state or government.
136. In this context a distinctron has to be
draun betu'een two different forms of closer co-
operation the first, as descnbed above, stems
directly from the apphcation of the modrfied
Brussels Treaty u'hrle the second comes under
the CFSP and involves the bodies, procedures
and machinerl'for u'hich provtsion is made in the
Treatl' on European Unton. A rvholc series of
procedures have been proposed in this connec-
tion: some advocate that requests for closer co-
operation should be made by each member state
or by the European Commission (the Franco-
German proposal), by EU member states that are
also members of WEU (the Itahan proposal) or
by a majorrty of the member states in consulta-
tron with the European Commission (the Nether-
lands Presrdency's proposal).
137. Whrchever proposal the rntergovernmental
conference ma)'agree on. rt should be established
that the right for WEU, represented by' rts presi-
dency or rts Secretary-General, to make such a
request will be laid down in a provision of the
Treaty on European Unton on closer cooperation.
IV. The activities of the LYEU Council
138. Once again, it is not really possible to
comment on the actrvities of the Council given
that the second half of rts 42nd annual report,
covenng the pcrrod to December 1996, was not
conveyed to the Assembll' on trme. The Assem-
bly has been obliged to record on numerous
occasions that the Council rs clcarly taking its
obligatron to provide information under Artrcle
IX of the modified Brussels Treaty less and less
senousll' It is nou high trme the Council pro-
vided the Assembly with a plausible explanation
as to why it rs not possrble for rt to fonvard tts
annual report on time. It would appear that rt
has been the practice for some time that the
countries taking parl in WEU's work as
associate members, observers and associate
partncrs should also have an opporturuty' to
provide inputs to be used for the Counctl's report
but thrs should not result m the Assembly
recelvmg the information late. The obligatron to
provrde rnformatton is restricted now as before to
the ten states that are full members of WEU.
139. Irrespecttve of the confidentral nature of
the rnformatron the French Presrdency provrded
in late January and mid-April to thc Presrdential
Committee on the one hand and the Political and
Defence Commtttees on the other. it cannot be a
substitute for the officral report of the Council.
140. No information at all is available about
rvhether and to what extent WEU rs involved at
the rntergovernmental conference in the discus-
slons on sublects conccmed with the Organisa-
tion's future role in relationship to the Europcan
Uruon. There are onlv a feu'vague indtcattons as
to WEU's relattons u'rth NATO and the possi-
brlrty of it takrng part in the Alhance's CJTF
planning process A similar sttuatton also exists
rn respect of the agreement that has now appar-
ently been reached rn WEU for giving all its
assocrate members the possrbrlrtv of being
involved in thc WEU plannlng process for the
preparatton of WEU operatlons conducted in
accordance with the CJTF concept
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l4l What rs thc srtuatron rcgardrng the planned
"prlot nation" concept accordrng to uhrch a
mcmber state rvould be grven the task of mount-
rng a mrlrtar)' operatlon under WEU's control
and uh1 u'as thrs concept not put mto practice rn
thc Albanran cnsrs')
142 What progress has bcen made rn thc n'ork
berng done to assess the rrsks and challengcs for
European secuntv rn thc 2lst centun' rn the per-
spectl\'c of the enlargement of the Atlantrc Alh-
ance and the European Unron')
143 Accordrng to varrous press reports" WEU
is currentlv negotrating secuntv agreements rvrth
a number of obsener and assocrate partner
countrres m order to settle ruth thcm the problem
of exchangrng confidentral documcnts Thrs rs of
vrtal importancc u'rth a vte\\, to those countncs
takrng part rn Petcrsberg tasks under thc direc-
tron of WEU and urth the assrstance of NATO
structures Up till nou, rt u'ould appear that the
Unrted States has alxavs preferred such actron to
bc decided m thc frameu'ork of WEU and not by
the fifteen European Union member statcs It is
also rcported that the Amcncans rull rcfuse to
con!'cv confidentral documents to WEU untrl
thev arc certaln that thcv u'tll not be passcd on to
thc neutral members of thc European Unron On
the other hand. it rs berng sard that NATO itself
rs also rn the process of concludrng securitv
agrecments rn the framcu'ork of a reinforccd
Partnershrp for Peace u'ith countries partrcrpat-
rng rn thc PfP programme Thc Assembll'has no
detailed informatron u'hatsoer,'er about anv of
these sub;ects.
144. What progress has been madc on the fur-
ther development and actrvrtres of thc Plannrng
Cell and Srtuation Ccntre? What are the results
of the u'ork done bv the Planning Cell and the
Pcrmancnt Councrl on WEU's role in
pcacekeeprng operatlons n'rthin the frameu'ork of
Petcrsberg tasks?
145 What has been achieved as regards coor-
drnatron betu,een thc Plannrng Cell and thc ac-
trvrtrcs of the Satellrte Centrc and the elaboratron
of a concept for using the Centre,
146 What improvemcnts have been made in
u'orking relations betrveen WEU and the United
Natrons and u'hat conclusrons were reached at
thc Conferencc of the Uruted Natrons urth re-
gronal organisatrons, held from 14 to 16 Febru-
an' 1996. u'hrch the WEU Secretan'-General
attendcd? Hou' havc u'orkmg relations betu'sen
WEU and the OSCE dcveloped?
147 What part docs WEU rntend to plal' rn the
Euro-Medrterranean dralogue that has becn re-
launchcd bv the European Uruon')
148 In u'hat specrfic areas has therc bcen
practrcal progress m coopcratlon betu'een WEU.
the Russran Federatron and Ukrainc? With refcr-
ence to the Asscmbly's proposals m Recommcn-
datron 608. lr,hat tangrble measures are to be
taken to improve the status of the assoclate part-
ner countrres rn WEU')
149 Has anv rcal progress been made on arm-
aments cooperatlon and do any further plans
exrst for the WEU Institute for Securitv Studres?
l-50 The Councrl has strll not rephed to
Assemblv Recommendatrons 601, 605. 606 and
608 Its delav in dorng so makes it drfficult to
malntaln and develop a pcrmanent and meaning-
ful draloguc betrvccn the Assembll, and the
Councrl
V. Conclusions
151 Wrth onlv a fcs' months left beforc the
lntergovcmmental confcrence on the revision of
the Treatl'on European Uruon rs due to end. thrs
report rvrll bc the last opportunitv for the
Assembly'of WEU to make kno*n rts vieu.s and
put fom'ard rts proposals. As rt uould appear
that the Councrl rs not making any preparations
to go further than rts contnbution to the rnter-
govemmental confi:rcnce of the European Uruon.
n'luch rt submrtted to the EU on 14 Novcmber
1995. in an attempt to have WEU's posrtlon
discusscd rn the negotlatrons in the hght of the
latest progress made b1' the IGC, thc Assembll,'g
vrovs urll in all hkelihood represent the onlv
WEU posrtron that rvrll officialll.be made pubhc
beforc thc IGC ends this vear.
152. It rs qurte clear that fundamental drffer-
ences of oplnlon contrnuc to exist betu'een thc
governments of the membcr states represented rn
the WEU Councrl. Neither rs thcrc a unanimous
positron m the Assembly. But thcre should be no
differences of oprnion on the follourng funda-
mental issue:" Agence France Presse. 27 March 1997
32
DOCUMENT I56.1
Europe must have a credrble standrng in
secunty and defence matters Thrs apphes
primanly to crisrs managcment and mrh-
tary inten'ention to that end. Unill nou'
Europe has crther failed polrticallv and
mrlrtarill'm thrs area or has done no more
than help to implement dccisions takcn b1'
the Unrted States
153. WEU rs strll necessan' in order for thrs
crcdibility' to become a realrtv because rts mem-
ber states are the only countnes to have commit-
ted thcmselves urthout rcscrvation to assuming
jornt rcsponsibrlitv for thc consequcnces of a
common securrty and defence policv that covers
more than lust the managemcnt of cnscs. As 1'et
nobody knou's u'hether it u'rll also bc possible for
such a comprchcnsive commitment to be made
onc da1, in the Europcan Union as rvell. Your
Rapporteurs hope that those EU member states
strll reluctant to enter rnto all the obligations a
common dcfence requlres urll graduallv ol'er-
come therr mrsgrvings Thev also hope that the
European partners rn NATO urll be able to play
a substantral part in the common defencc iden-
titv
154 Lastl1'. the question of horv thc central
European countnes can be brought rnto the
u'hole process remarns to be clarified. Untrl all
these problems havc been solved, thcrc can be no
real mtegratron betu'een WEU and thc European
Unron The submrssron of a phased plan for
such integratron u'ould thcreforc sccm to be pre-
mature and rt should not be carned out unless rt
can be formulated in such a way as to avord anv
n'atenng dou'n of the mutual assrstance obhga-
tion and any' srdelmmg of a substantial number of
states.
155. Srmrlarll,. the drafting of detailed provi-
sions in an attempt to 1a1' doun the condrtions
and arrangements r,r'herebl' a country could have
recoursc to the optron of constructive abstention.
rlould force it to take actron rt u'ould not neces-
sanll' ursh to takc on an lssue on u'hrch rt had
doubts. thereby' producing prcciselv thc opposrtc
effect of the purpose flexrbrlity is intended to
servc This rs a clear cxample u'hcrc trcatv
u'ordrng rs not a reflectron of polrtrcal urll but
actuall1, sets out to imposc political u,rll u'herc rt
does not rn fact exrst
156 If rt is agreed that recourse must contrnue
to be had to WEU at least for a transrtronal
perrod. WEU must havc the possrbilitr', and put
rt mto practrce. of takrng rts o\\rl polrtical
decisrons on the basrs of the modrfied Brussels
Treatl' u'hrle remainrng readv to take actron rn
crrsrs srtuatrons on bchalf of thc European Unron.
Temporanll/ preserylng WEU's autonoml'm thrs
u'a1,' u'rll also be cxtremely, rmportant rn the
process of the Atlantrc and European instrtutions
operung to countrrcs rn the cast and south
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APPENDIX
Proposed amendments to Article J.,l of the TEU
Letter from Mr Kinkel, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany,
to Mr van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affiirs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
27 March 1997
As alreadl' arnounced b;" the French Muuster wrth responsibility for European Affarrs, Mr Bamrer,
and Mruster of State Hol'cr at the meetrrg of thc EU Govemmental Conference on l0 March 1997, Belgium,
France, Itall', Luxembourg, Spain and Germanv have produced a document to be appended to the Treaty on
European Uruon ufuch. subject to legal re\.re\r', could take the form of a Protocol to Article J 4 2. Tlus
document, and the proposcd amendmcnts to Article J.4.2, as proposed bv the French representative on l0
March 1997, constrtute a Jomt proposal by the sx states on thc secuntl' and defencc aspects of the Treaty on
European Uruon I have becn requested to fonvard these proposals to the Netherlands Presidency on behalf of
all srx states rrvolved and should be grateful rf the texls could bc officially passed on to the other partrers m
advance of the Foreign Muusters' meetrng m Rome on 25 March
Klaus KINKEL
34
APPENDIX DOCLMENT 1564
Article J.4 of the Treoty on European Union
Article J.4.1:
Proposed Presidency text
The common foreign and security policy shall rnclude all questrons relatrng to the securitv of thc Union,
including the progrcssrve framing of a common defence policl' rn the perspective of a common defence
Proposed amendments by Belgium, Germany, Spatn, France, Italy and Luxembourg
Thc common forergn and securitl'policy shall include all questrons relatrng to the security of the Union,
including the progrcssive framrng of a common defence policy' in the perspectrve of a corrlmon defence.
The common dcfence policl' shall include the framrng of principles, aims and means in the defence field.
Proposed Prestdency text
Questions referred to in thrs Article shall includc humanitanan and rescue tasks. peacekeeping tasks and
tasks of combat forces ln cnsrs management, mcludmg peacemakrng.
Proposed amendments by Belgum, Germany, Spam, France, Italy and Luxembourg
The Petersberg tasks (humanitarian tasks, rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces m
cnsls management. includrng peacemaking) shall be the first expresston of a common sccunty and
dcfcncc polic1,. Armaments polio'shall be an integral part of the common defence policy.
Article J.4.2:
Proposed Prestdency text
The Western European Uruon (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the European Union and
the Umon shall accordingly'foster closer institutronal relatrons with it.
Proposed amendments by Belgum, Germanlt, Spam, France, Italy and Luxembourg
The Western European Uruon (WEU) is an intcgral part of the devclopment of the European Union and
the Membcr States have therefore made rt thcrr aim to integrate the WEU progresstvelv tnto the Euro-
pean Union. They wrll rvork activelf in the Union and the WEU to achieve that arm Integration shall
be achieved m several stagcs rvhich shall be defined m greater detail in a Protocol appended to thrs
Treaty. The first stage shall commence urth the entry mto force of this Treaty; the transition to the
further stages shall bc dctermined by Decrsron of the Council. meetrng at Head of State and Government
level.
Proposed Prestdencv text
The Unron rvrll avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Uruon
u'hich have defence rmphcatrons
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Proposed amendments by Belgttm, Germany, Sparn, Irance, Itallt and Luxembourg
Thc Unron u'ill al'arl rtself of the WEU to elaborate and rmplcment decrsrons and actrons of thc Uruon
u'hrch have defence rmphcations Thc compctence of the European Councrl to establish gurdehnes in
accordance u'ith Artrclc J lb shall also obtam in respect of the WEU
Thc Council shall. on the basrs of gencral guidehnes lard doun bv the Europcan Council, ensure unr-
form and conststent actron on the part of thc Unron and of the WEU and shall m agreement rlrth the
WEU adopt the necessan, practrcal arrangements
Article J.4.3:
Proposed Prestdency text
When the Unron has recourse to the WEU to elaborate and rmplcmcnt decisions of the Unron on the
tasks refcrrcd to in paragraph l. all Member Statcs of the Unron shall be entitled to partrcipate fuIl1, rn
the tasks in qucstron
The Councrl shall, m agreement rvith the instrtutrons of the WEU. adopt the nccessar!' practrcal
arrangements
Thcse arrangemcnts shall allou' all Member States contnbutrng to the tasks in questron to partrcipate
fullv and equallv in planning and decrsron-making in thc WEU rnsofar as these relate to the commrtment
and dcplolment of that Member State's natronal contnbutron
Dectstons having defence implicatrons dealt urth under thrs paragraph shall be taken rvithout preludice
to thc pohcres and obligations referred to rn paragraph 5
Proposed amendments b1, Belgtum, Gerntanl,, Spatn. France, Italy and Ltxembourg
Whcn thc Uruon has rccoursc to the WEU to claborate and implement decrsrons of the Union on the
tasks referred to in paragraph I. the Councrl shall. rn agreement urth the rnstrtutrons of the WEU. takc
partrcular care to ensurc that all Member States of the Umon ma1' partrcipate full1' rn the WEU in thc
elaboratron and implementatron of the decrsrons and actlons of thc Unron referred to rn I
Delete the remarnder of the proposed Presrdencv tcxt
Article J.4.1:
Proposed Prestdency text
Thc Councrl shall act unantmousll' shcn deahng rvith rssues under thrs Artrcle having mrlrtan' or
dcfence rmphcatrons
J 4 3 deleted
J 4 4 unchanged, as neu J 4 5
J 4 5 unchanged, as neu J.4 6
J.4 6 delcted
Proposed amendments by Belgtum. Germanv, Spatn, France, Itoll'and Luxembourg
Arrangemcnt rn the overall context of the CFSP decrsron-taking proccdure.
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Document on Article J.4 to the Treaty on European Union
The High Contractmg Parties,
desiring to specrfr m greater detail the phases for the integratron of the Westem European Union into
the Europcan Union referred to rn paragraph 2 of Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union,
have agreed upon the following provrsions, u'hich shall be annexed to the Treatl,on European Uruon:
Article I
The rntegratton of the Western European Union (WEU) into the European Unron shall be gradually
rmplemented durrng a transrtron perrod of approximately .. years. This transition period shall consist
of three phases Each phasc shall involve a u'holc range of measures whrch must be rmplemented before
transrtron to the next phase.
Transition to the next phase shall depend on the Councilr stating in a report that thc measures lard down
for the prevrous phase have essentrallv been implemented. On thrs basis, the Council, meeting at the
level of the Heads of State or Government, shall decide upon the transrtlon to thc next phase2.
Phase I shall begrn upon entry, rnto force of the Treaty on . .. The report referred to in paragraph 2
above shall be submitted to the Council, meetrng at the level of the Heads of State or Government, after
... )'ears If the Council decidcs to make thc transrtron to the next phase, it shall at the same time set the
date for the presentation of a report on the implementatron of the measures envisaged for the phase in
question If no decision is reached on transition to the next phase, a new report shall be submrtted
arurualll' to the Council, meeting at the level of the Heads of State and Government.
Article 2
Durrng the first phase, while maintainrng the instrtutronal independence of the WEU and wrthm the pol-
icy' gurdehnes sct b1' the European Council, the foundations of a corrrmon Europcan defence pohcy as
part of the Unron's Common Foreign and Securitl'Policy shall be laid and the structures, rules and pro-
cedures of both organisatrons harmonrsed. In partrcular, dunng this phase.
thc practrcal arrangements for cooperatlon between the WEU and the Uruon envisaged in
paragraph 2 of Article J 4 shall be elaborated u,ith a vrew to linking the consultatron- and
decisron-making processcs of the WEU and the Unron in crrsis situations;
the WEU shall be readv to elaborate and implement dccrsrons and actions havmg defence
implications for which the EU has recourse to the WEU. The Council rn'ill politrcallv monrtor
the implemcntation;
procedures shall be dcveloped u'hich will ensure that the participatory nghts of the Associate
Members and Associatc Partners of the WEU are fullv taken into account when transferring
decision-making powers from the WEU to the Unron.
the sequence of presidencies of the WEU and the Unron shall be harmonrsed as much as pos-
srble;
This statement should be made by the Council meeting at the level of the foreign and the defence ministers
The prrncrplc of flexibrhS' ma1' be applied.
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- 
arrangements for closer cooperatron of the rvork of the staff of the WEU Secretariat and the
Sccrctanat of the Council of the Unron shall be set up (rncludrng possibilities for exchange
and secondment of personncl).
- 
specrfic steps shall be taken to preparc a double-hattrng of the post of Secretary-General of the
Secretanat of the Union rvrth the Secretanat of the WEU.
- 
admrnrstratrve rules and practiccs of the Union and thc WEU shall be harmonrsed;
a rvhrte paper shall be drarrn up s'ithin the framervork of the Unron's Common Foretgn and
Sccuntv Policf in cooperatron rvrth and bascd on the rvork alreadr,' carried out tn the WEU,
outlmmg a common dcfcnce policy concept m pursurt of the Uruon's common security inter-
ests.
- Jolnt pohcrcs shall be elaborated ln areas rvhcre the knorv-horv and optlons for actron of both
organrsatrons can complement each other in a meanrngful u'ay'(rncludrng armament pohcy);
agrcement shall be reachcd among EU, WEU and NATO on hou'thc institutional and opera-
tronal relations are to be developed rcflecting the need for full transparency and, as necessary,
jornt consultatrons on holl'to addrcss conttngencies
Article 3
Dunng the second phase. the WEU shall remam rcsponsrble for the rmplementatron of military actions
of the Union in thc field of cnsrs management, rvhereas the Unron shall assume the decrsion-making
power, binding also on the WEU, to mltlate the actron. The Unron lvrll monitor rts rmplementatron from
the polrtrcal pornt of vreu' and may modrfu the mandate and/or tcrminatc the action tn accordance with
developmcnts and rn close coordinatron u'rth the WEU Durrng thrs phase rn particular,
- 
the Secrctanat of thc WEU shall be mcorporated into the Secretanat of the Council of the
Unton,
arrangements shall bc d*'eloped to allorv for the drrect use of the WEU Plannrng Ccll, the
Srtuatron Ccntre and the Satellite Centre bl'the EU.
links shall bc cstablished bctrveen the relevant rnstrtutions of the EU and the WEU in order to
make possrble the transfer of competenccs envisaged for Phase 3;
drrect hnks shall be estabhshed bets'een the EU and the polrtico-military structures of the
WEU.
the decrsion-makrng power, u'hich shall also be bindrng upon the WEU, to rnitiate the military
actrons referred to rn sentencc I abovc. shall be assumed by the Council of the Unron3,
the procedures developed in Phase I for hnkrng the WEU Associate Members and Associate
Partners to the EU decrsion-making process wrll full1'appl1,;
cooperation betu'een the Union and NATO shall be rntensified m lme with the state of coop-
eration betu'een the WEU and NATO.
3 The decrsrons shall be taken by the Councrl meeting rn the composrtion of the forergn and the defence
ministers.
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Article 4
During the thrrd phase, thc rntegratron process shall be completcd bv
transfernng the competences of the institutrons and bodres of the WEU to the relevant institu-
trons of the EU and incorporatmg other remalnlng WEU structures rnto the EU.
tncorporatmg the assrstance guarantee laid doim rn Article V of the modified Brussels Trcaty'
rnto the Treaty on European Union or an addrtronal protocol to the Treatl' u'hich should con-
tain the approprratc instrtutronal mechanisms for the cooperatron of partrcrpatrng Member
States on issues of terntonal defence makrng use of the polrtrco-military structures of the EU
In the process. the right of each Member State of the Unron not to participatc in an assrstance
mechantsm shall be respected. Atthe sametime, a dnftrng apart of the defence commrtments
in the EU and NATO, u'htch rvould u-eaken the transatlantrc sccuritv link, must be avorded.
all Contractrng Parties tcrmrnating the modrfied Brussels Trcatl' on the dav
mechanrsm contamed in the Treaty on European Umon or an additronal protocol
enters into force for them;
intensif ing drrect relations betwecn the Union and NATO in order to develop :
operation prevrouslv exrsting betrveen the WEU and the Alhance.
the assistance
I to thrs Treaty
further the co-
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